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CHAPTER I PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Contracting by Region 
The use of contractual arrangements for pork production 
varies by region, as shown in Table 1-1. The west north 
central region (which includes Iowa) actually produces more 
pork on contract than any other region. However, the relative 
importance of contract pork production in this region, as 
measured by its percentage of total pork marketed, is not as 
great as in the south Atlantic or north east regions. This is 
due to the fact that contracting has been slower to develop in 
the north central region than in other regions, especially the 
south Atlantic (Futrell, 1989). This appears to be changing 
in recent years. 
In order to understand why and to examine the reasons 
for contracting it is useful to examine regional differences 
in pork production as shown in Table 1-2. These competitive 
factors were described by Roy in 1972. Roy compares the south 
to the midwest and concludes that farmers in the south were 
seeking new enterprises such as pork production, but did not 
have the necessary managerial knowledge and did not 
traditionally view hogs as a profitable enterprise. Roy also 
concluded that farmers in the south were willing to produce 
hogs at a lower profit. In addition, he believed that credit 
was less available to farmers in the south than to farmers in 
the midwest. 
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The implications Roy drew from these factors were that 
contract production of pork would be primarily located in the 
south. This was because contractual arrangements would 
provide a source of capital to southern farmers in the face of 
credit limitations, provide lower (but acceptable) levels of 
profit in return for limiting the farmers' risk, and provide 
management expertise in pork production in a region where it 
was lacking. In other words, contract pork production in the 
south would overcome some of the competitive barriers and 
competitive disadvantages of this region, enabling the south 
to become a major pork production region. These predictions 
were, for the most part, accurate until about 1983, when 
contracting activity began to expand in the midwest (Futrell, 
1989). Regional shifts in the competitive factors listed in 
Table 1-2 seemed to be occurring. Important changes occurring 
were the level of risk that pork producers faced (factor 11), 
the availability of capital (factor 3), and the availability 
of a labor supply (factor 2). 
Since contract production of pork is a risk sharing 
mechanism, this type of business organization would likely 
appeal to individuals operating in a riskier environment or to 
individuals who cannot survive adverse outcomes because of 
their financial position. Returns to pork producers, however, 
were however fairly consistent until recently (Futrell, 1989). 
Hog prices became much more variable since the decade of the 
sixties. This was caused by changes in consumer demand and 
3 
greater variability in feed prices (Futrell and Wisner, 1987). 
The increasing volatility of returns in recent years seems to 
have led to increased contracting activity in order for pork 
producers to limit or control risk. Additional risk also 
serves to limit the amount of capital producers would be 
willing to invest in a pork production enterprise. 
Variability of returns would also imply that the pork 
production enterprise may not generate sufficient capital to 
finance existing or new facilities. Credit institutions also 
respond to additional risk, limiting the amount of capital 
they are willing to invest in pork production enterprises. 
Poor returns to pork production during much of the 1981-1985 
period combined with the financial problems of the 
agricultural sector during this same period also limited the 
availability of capital for pork production in many farm 
operations (Futrell, 1989). 
The true test of these factors' influence on contracting 
in Iowa may be found in surveys of contract producers. In 
1987, nearly three-fourths of all contract feeders in did so 
for financial reasons (Rhodes, Flottman, and Proctor, 1987). 
The financial reasons included availability of capital and 
cash flow problems (or financial risk). In 1989, after some 
notable increases in farm income for the agricultural sector, 
the percentage of contract feeders who did so for financial 
reasons was still about fifty percent (Rhodes, Flottman, and 
Proctor, 1989). The percentage of contract feeders that did 
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so for reduction of price risk and a steadier income remained 
at abut twenty percent for both surveys. Other reasons 
included the desire to utilize available labor and access to 
improved management, and these factors became somewhat more 
important as a reason for contracting in the 1989 survey. 
Contracts and Risk Management 
Contract production of pork offers a feeder an 
opportunity to share risk with a contractor or owner. In 
particular it is the owner who bears most or all of price 
variability, depending on the specific arrangement. In 
addition, the owner provides a substantial portion of the 
capital required for pork production. This capital is 
provided directly through the provision of animals, feed, and 
other inputs, again depending on the specific arrangement. 
For many contractual arrangements the feeder or producer 
provides (at a minimum) facilities and labor. Management is 
provided by both parties in varying degrees. 
Contractual arrangements for pork production, however, do 
not eliminate all risks for the feeder. Although the feeder 
provides labor and facilities it is the owner who typically 
controls decisions about the type of livestock provided, when 
livestock are provided, and the quality of inputs provided. 
Compensation schedules are designed to ensure the feeder 
operates in the owner's interest through incentives based on 
such factors as death loss and feed efficiency. This 
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compensation schedule attempts to minimize the owner's risk 
that inputs provided will not be adversely affected by the 
quality and quantity of labor provided by the producer. This 
can lead to the feeder having responsibility and bonuses for 
output levels and input use without control of some of the 
primary factors that influence these results. 
Another source of risk to a feeder is the length of the 
contract and the ease or difficulty of terminating this 
arrangement. Many contracts are for one year or less with 
options for renewal. However, more recent contracts are 
written for a specified time period or a certain number of 
groups of animals. Even with this there is risk of idle 
facilities as the time period and number of groups of animals 
are not combined. The bottom line is that the feeder faces 
the risk that facilities provided will be unoccupied. If the 
feeder has financed these facilities with debt capital there 
is a risk of not being able to meet principal and interest 
payments in the event of contract termination or delays 
between animal placings. Given that facilities are typically 
financed over five to seven years, a one year contract subject 
to termination is a source of financial risk to both a feeder 
and the feeder's lender. If a pork production facility and 
contractual arrangement are viewed as a capital budgeting 
problem, then this implies that the life of the project is 
uncertain. 
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Problem statement 
The production of pork through contractual arrangements 
is currently an established form of business organization and 
interest in this type of type of arrangement is increasing for 
the reasons stated above. As indicated, contracts offer the 
parties involved an opportunity to share risk. The key 
problem is how well does a contractual arrangement perform 
this function of risk sharing relative to other contracts and 
to a sole proprietorship type of business organization. 
Knowledge of this will aid feeders and owners alike in 
better understanding and analyzing contracts. Also, in light 
of current and possible future legal restrictions on vertical 
integration in agriculture, information of this sort will aid 
interested individuals in making decisions on these 
restrictions. 
Objectives of the Study 
In E. P. Roy's Contract Farming and Integration the 
author states that he was "impressed by the slow pace of 
economic research in the field of contract farming and 
economic integration". Only recently has interest in this 
area been rekindled and so the overall objective of this study 
is to expand the knowledge of contract farming and economic 
integration. 
In particular, a primary objective of this research is to 
develop a theoretical framework for economic analysis of pork 
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production contracts. This framework will focus on providing 
insights into the structure of contracts as they currently 
exist and on providing alternative structures and adjustments. 
A second and underlying objective is to develop a 
framework for the analysis of the risk and return inherent to 
contract production of pork. This is important to the study 
of contractual arrangements since this form of business 
organization is essentially a risk sharing mechanism. 
A third objective is to use the analytical framework 
developed to compare the risk, return, and incentives for 
productivity for related pork production contracts with the 
risk, return, and incentives for productivity for independent 
pork producers. For many contractual arrangements a contract 
producer's income variability results from biological factors 
only. These factors, such as death loss or feed efficiency, 
determine the producer's income via a contract's compensation 
schedule. Price risk is accepted by the contractor or owner 
and so the contract is a risk sharing mechanism. The 
independent owner and operator also faces risk from biological 
factors, but high levels of production efficiency are not 
sufficient to guarantee profitability, since a period of low 
prices may imply low or negative returns. Price risk also may 
include periods of high prices implying high returns for the 
independent producer, whereas a contract producer's returns 
are limited by biological limits to production and so it would 
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be the contractor that benefits from high prices. 
A final objective of this study is to aid both producers 
and owners in developing effective contracts. Table 1-2 
listed some market forces that are determining the extent to 
which pork production contracts are used in any given region. 
In order for this market to work properly, however, all 
participants should have access to an adequate data base. 
This will enable interested parties to understand and evaluate 
the current market forces that have led to existing contracts 
and to possibly improve these contracts as a form of business 
organization. Contracts are a form of business organization 
and organization is being increasingly appreciated as an 
important influence on the productivity of economic 
enterprises (Tomer, 1987). 
Thesis Organization 
In the remainder of the thesis, the research completed in 
pursuing the objectives is summarized. In Chapter II, 
previous research on contract production of pork is discussed. 
Chapter III describes theoretical developments in the 
principal-agent paradigm and a model of pork production 
contracts using this framework is presented. Optimal 
compensation schedules are derived and are compared to 
selected contracts with suggestions for modification and 
improvement of these contracts. In Chapter IV the emphasis 
changes from optimization to that of risk analysis of pork 
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production contracts. A mean and variance model of risk and 
returns for contracts is presented and evaluated. In Chapter 
V the specification and estimation of a firm level model of 
pork production with comparative analysis of independent 
ownership pork production and representative contracts is 
described. Measures of risk and returns for these 
alternatives are presented and analyzed. Finally, Chapter VI 
summarizes the research and provides recommendations for 
further research. 
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Table I-l. Marketing of hogs and pigs by contract producers 
Region 
(Marketings in Thousands) 
NE® ENCb WNC° SC® 
Contractées 
Total 
Contractées % 
of Total 
571 515 
1,575 21,783 
36.3 2.4 
1,221 448 
34,953 4,788 
3.5 9.4 
410 86 
3,364 3,514 
12.2 2.4 
®NE = northeastern states. 
E^NC = east north central states. 
®WNC = west north central states. 
'^ SA = south Atlantic states. 
®SC = south central states. 
% = western states. 
Source: Rhodes, V.J. U.S. Contract Production of Hoas. 
University of Missouri Agricultural Economics Report 
No. 1990-1. 
11 
Table 1-2. Competitive factors between the middle west and 
south in hog production 
Middle West 
1. A surplus of corn, which is 
fed mostly to hogs. 
2. Labor supply on corn farms 
can be best utilized for 
hogs at certain seasons of 
the year where hogs fit 
well in the farm plan. 
3. Credit for the corn-hog 
farmer is readily 
available and sufficient 
even to tenants. 
4. Hog management know-how is 
widespread and efficient. 
5. Hog markets and processing 
plants are numerous. 
6. Per capita pork consumption 
is equal to the national 
average. 
7. Hogs are already a major 
enterprise. 
8. Pork is now exported to 
the South, which is 
deficient in hog 
production. 
South 
1. A deficit area which 
imports corn from 
the Middle West. 
2. Labor supply is 
abundant but cannot 
be utilized in hogs 
unless specialized 
to a high degree in 
producing feeder pigs 
or market hogs. 
3. Credit is less available 
to small, part-time or 
tenant farmers who might 
be interested in hogs. 
4. Hog management know-how 
is limited and not 
always efficient. 
5. Hog markets are more 
limited and hog 
processors are few. 
6. Per capita pork 
consumption is above 
the national average. 
7. Farmers are seeking new 
enterprises, shifting 
from crop enterprises 
to hogs. Poultry and 
eggs compete for local 
grain. 
8. Only 50 percent of the 
South's pork consumption 
is produced in the 
South. 
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Table 1-2. (continued) 
Middle West 
9. Farmers are already 
integrated by raising 
their own feeder pigs 
and corn for feeding. 
In marketing, integration 
is less apparent. 
10. While corn acreage 
expansion might be 
limited, better yields 
are not. 
11. Farmers traditionally 
have netted good returns 
from hogs and from corn 
fed to hogs. They are 
willing to take more risks. 
12. Harsher climatic conditions 
require more investment in 
facilities and equipment. 
South 
9. Farmers are less 
integrated because 
feeder pigs have to 
be bought as well as 
corn. Dressed pork is 
imported to fill needs. 
10. Both corn and milo 
acreage and yields 
could be expanded 
substantially. 
11. Farmers traditionally 
have not found hogs 
profitable but are 
willing to produce hogs 
at a lower profit than 
in the Middle West. 
Hogs are considered a 
risky enterprise. 
12. Milder climatic 
conditions help reduce 
fixed investments. 
13. Property taxes are high. 13. Property taxes are low. 
Greater compi 
advantage in 
feeder pigs. 
14. Greater competitive advantage 14. petitive 
in fattening hogs. producing 
Source; Roy, E.P. Contract Farming and Economic Integration. 
1972. 
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CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 
Some types of risk sharing arrangements have received 
substantial theoretical and empirical study. Lease 
arrangements in the farm sector have been examined both in 
terms of their ability to achieve cost efficiency and their 
ability to alter the lessee's or lessor's risk. Contract 
farming, on the other hand, has received relatively little 
attention. A survey of the literature indicates that research 
has largely been descriptive with some analysis (using simple 
partial budgeting) of existing contracts and their sensitivity 
to selected factors. 
Descriptive Studies 
Roy (1972) provides an overview of contract pork 
production. This overview includes descriptions of type of 
contractual arrangements for both feeder pig production and 
feeder pig finishing. It also includes a description of the 
advantages and disadvantages of contract farming. The 
contracts described are similar in concept to current types of 
contracts, Roy also identifies a number of issues which are 
relevant to a current analysis of pork production contracts. 
One such issue involves possible conflicts between producers 
and contractors in periods of low hog prices. Producers 
operating under a contract often do not plan to curtail 
production when prices are low, since their income depends on 
the number of pigs raised or finished. Contractors, however, 
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may find it necessary to reduce production during these 
periods. The result is that returns and variability of 
returns to a feeder from a contract will be affected by a 
contractor's decisions on placing animals over time. 
Incentives to the producer are also discussed. Roy indicates 
that incentive plans represent an attempt by the contractor to 
provide the producer with the motivation to "become part of 
the integrated hog program", or in other words, to operate in 
the contractor's interest, a key issue in designing 
contractual arrangements. Roy also identifies financial risk 
as a principal reason for contracting and points out that if 
producers are not in a financial position to take risks, they 
should consider contracting as an alternative to operating 
independently. To aid this decision a partial budgeting 
framework for comparison of returns from contracting with that 
of ownership is provided. In addition, Roy also lists twenty 
five research issues in economic integration, all of which are 
relevant to the current environment. Of these, three are 
especially relevant to this study. These three issues are 
what constitutes an ideal contract , how can contracts be 
specifically tailored so the farmer is rewarded consistent 
with production efficiency, and which type of contract among 
all those being offered provides the farmer the best 
combination of risk and returns. 
Two other studies have described contract production of 
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pork (Lawrence, Hayenga, Kliebenstein, and Rhodes, 1992; 
Futrell, 1989). Like the study by Roy (1972) these 
researchers give information on the reasons for contracting, 
descriptions of various contract arrangements, and advantages 
and disadvantages of contracting. In addition, they provide 
some information on specific contractors types of contracts, 
and characteristics of a good contract. 
Risk and Return studies 
Recent work on pork production contracts has sought to 
provide some financial analysis of the risk and returns to 
contract producers (Zearing and Seals, 1989; Kliebenstein, 
Stevermer, and Hillburn, 1989; Hetland and Kliebenstein, 
1991). These studies use partial budgeting to examine 
financial returns to a producer or feeder under various 
contracts. 
Zearing and Seals (1989) utilize one feeder pig 
production contract and one feeder pig finishing contract for 
their study. Using an actual producer's records for a pork 
enterprise, they examine cash flow for both contracts over an 
eight year period. They found that cash flow is relatively 
stable, but overall returns to a producer are at the breakeven 
point for the feeder pig finishing contract and are at a loss 
for feeder pig production when fixed costs of facilities are 
included. Fixed costs are determined by a fifteen year 
amortization. Their analysis also shows that contractors 
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achieved a small profit over the same period for both 
contracts. One limitation of this analysis is that it does 
not include any sensitivity analysis based on the life of the 
contract and the term of the loan for facilities. The term or 
life of the contractual arrangements they describe are 
guaranteed for only one year, whereas debt financing for 
facilities is amortized over a fifteen year period. This 
would add additional risk to the producer, since this 
represents financing a long term asset based on cash flows 
guaranteed for only one year. 
Hetland and Kliebenstein (1991) use weekly production 
records for a feeder pig production enterprise to examine 
three feeder pig production contracts. Each of the contracts 
provided the producer with a positive return after all 
expenses. They also found that there was a substantial 
difference in the producer's returns for apparently similar 
feeder pig production contracts. When the compensation 
schedules for the three contracts were applied to the same 
producer's production levels, net returns to the producer 
ranged from $40,196 to $16,296, depending on the contract, 
showing that careful evaluation of contracts will benefit the 
producer substantially. The actual producer involved also 
indicated that monthly payments were an important factor in 
choosing a contract, as this provided a steady cash flow, 
indicating liquidity and timing of payments may be as 
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important as total net returns. 
Kliebenstein, Stevermer, and Hillburn (1989) use a 
similar partial budgeting approach to examine a variety of 
feeder pig finishing and feeder pig production contracts. 
Their analysis includes compensation schedules that 
incorporate flat fees and production incentives and, 
alternatively, compensation schedules that incorporate flat 
fees and profit sharing in lieu of production incentives. 
Returns are estimated for a hypothetical pork enterprise using 
sensitivity analysis for prices, production efficiency, and 
life of the contract. Their results indicate that incentives, 
either through production efficiency or profit sharing, are 
necessary for producers to achieve profitability and cover 
fixed costs of facilities. Returns are also found to be 
sensitive to the life of the contract. The various types of 
contracts are examined for variability of returns relative to 
each other. Contracts that offered flat fees (such as a base 
payment per pig or per sow) and production incentives showed 
less variability in returns to the producer than profit 
sharing contracts. This reflects the elimination of price 
risk for the feeder in the flat fee contracts. Contracts that 
offer relatively larger flat fees and smaller production 
incentives provided less variable returns to the feeder than 
contracts that had relatively smaller flat fees and larger 
production incentives. 
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The use of partial budgeting and sensitivity analysis in 
these studies represent a simple and straight forward initial 
screening of contracts and provides valuable information for 
the development of a risk analysis approach. The weakness of 
partial budgeting and sensitivity analysis is that this method 
considers changes in only one variable at a time and so cannot 
capture the impact of simultaneous changes in multiple 
variables on outcomes such as net returns or cash flow. 
None of these studies compares the risk and return of 
pork production contracts with that of independent ownership, 
a key choice variable for producers. It is likely that 
contracts will offer a producer less risk relative to 
independent ownership, but contracts will also limit the 
upside potential of returns in periods of high prices. The 
extent of this trade off between risk and returns between 
contracts and independent ownership has not been examined in 
these studies. 
Theoretical and Conceptual Models 
Blaich (1960) provides a conceptual framework of the 
structure of firms which emphasizes changes in vertical 
structure. He then applies this framework to pork production. 
His main conclusion is that pork production will likely become 
separated from corn production. This separation would occur 
due to increases in efficiency from specialization and new 
technology which in turn would end the advantage that the pork 
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and corn producer enjoys in terms of input complementarity. 
Blaich's analysis is based solely on efficiency arguments and 
ignores risk sharing implications as reasons for contracting. 
In light of consistent returns to pork production during this 
period, this is understandable. However, in the current 
environment of volatile returns and lack of capital 
availability, his framework adds little to the analysis of 
contract farming. As already stated, currently few producers 
who contract do so primarily because of access to improved 
management and technology but instead enter into contracts as 
a means of managing financial or price risk. 
Roy (1972) and Long (1989) make a substantial 
contribution towards recommended contractual agreements. 
Their focus is on specific terms of contracts and what these 
types of arrangements should provide for in the written 
agreement. Since they use a legal framework they do not 
attempt to provide for ideal or optimal contracts. However, 
their work provides insights into issues that a theoretical 
framework should address. For example, both recognized that a 
contractor has a significant impact on output levels through 
his or her provision of inputs and the quantity, quality, and 
timing of these inputs. If these impacts are extended to a 
theoretical model of contract farming, then a theoretical 
analysis must include the impact of the contractor's actions 
on output and compensation to the feeder. 
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Reimund, Martin, and Moore (1981) developed a prototype 
structural change model for agricultural subsectors based on 
changes in the broiler, cattle feeding, and processing 
vegetables subsectors. Their model suggests that structural 
changes in agriculture takes place in four stages. The stages 
are technological change, shift in the location of production, 
growth and development, and adjustments to risks. They 
surmised that the pork subsector was in the second or the 
shift of location in production stage. The fourth stage, 
adjustments to risks, emphasizes the impact of production 
contracts and coordination within a subsector as risk 
management methods. 
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CHAPTER III THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PARADIGM AND PORK 
PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 
Although pork production contracts have been in existence 
for a number of years, there is a lack of standardization in 
the terms and provisions of these contracts (Long, 1989) . In 
addition, a number of important items influencing the risk and 
return of contract production are often not included in the 
contract (Long, 1989). 
Most contracts include payments to a producer for labor 
and facilities as specified in a compensation schedule 
included in the contract. The contractor provides pigs, feed, 
veterinary services, and medicine. Compensation is based on a 
base payment per pig plus bonuses for such factors as feed 
efficiency and death loss levels. 
Various contracts of this sort were examined in 
Kliebenstein, Stevermer, and Hillburn (1989). One of the 
results of their analysis was that base payments alone were 
not sufficient to ensure replacement of facilities and profit 
for the producer. Higher returns were possible through 
production bonuses, included in many contracts. These bonuses 
required feed efficiency and death loss levels beyond some 
fixed standard established in the contract. 
Since the contractor or owner provides a large portion of 
the inputs and the producer or feeder is compensated at least 
in part on production and efficiency levels, the compensation 
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is influenced by the contractor's level of investment, which 
in turn influences the quality and quantity of contractor 
provided inputs. The key issue is that the compensation 
schedule may be a function of the productive resources 
provided by the contractor in spite of the fact that the 
producer has no control over these factors. Economic theory 
has provided a framework to examine these types of issues, the 
principal-agent paradigm. 
The Principal-Agent Paradigm 
The principal-agent paradigm can be described as follows 
(McDonald, 1984). One individual, called the agent, chooses 
some action that results in an outcome, X. The outcome, X, 
results from this action and also depends on the state of 
nature that prevails, so uncertainty is intrinsic to the 
situation. The outcome provides utility to a second 
individual, the principal. The principal's problem is to 
design a compensation function for the agent before any 
production takes place. When the principal can observe 
neither the action of the agent nor the state of nature that 
will prevail, a moral hazard issue arises because the agent's 
action affects the probability distribution of the outcome. 
Thus, the compensation function's purpose is to induce the 
agent to operate in the principal's interest as well as their 
own. 
In most principal-agent models the principal takes a 
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passive role in production once a reward function is designed 
(Carmichael, 1983). Profits or output are then determined by 
the agent's efforts and the state of nature. 
However, a contractor (principal) does not play a passive role 
in pork production contracts in that this individual provides 
much of the investment and operating capital through feed 
rations, livestock, and other inputs. This in turn, implies 
the contractors can influence output through their actions. 
Thus the standard principal-agent framework described above 
must be modified. This modified framework is based on the 
research of Demski and Feltham (1978) and Callen and Livnat 
(1989). 
The Producer's Optimal Compensation 
Assume a contractual arrangement involving a single 
contractor and a single producer. The contractor provides the 
producer with pigs, feed, and veterinary services. The level 
of these resources, K, measured in dollars, is determined 
solely by the contractor. They represent factors beyond the 
producer's control. 
The arrangement also provides the producer with a 
compensation package, C. In a principal-agent context this 
compensation schedule is designed so that the producer 
operates in the contractor's interest. As the producer's 
effort is not observable, compensation is based on production 
levels and input use, observable by both parties. 
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Although the producer provides facilities, the contractor 
has the opportunity to observe the facilities and use a 
forcing contract. This means that the facilities must meet 
specifications set by the contractor. This is in contrast to 
the producer's effort and management, which, again, is not 
observable. If the producer's effort were observable, the 
producer could be directly instructed to select the optimal 
level of effort. In addition, the producer could then be paid 
a constant amount to reward that level of effort. 
The issue to be addressed is whether or not factors 
outside the producer's control will be included in an optimal 
compensation package, or is compensation a function only of 
the output (or its value) produced by the contractual 
arrangement, the producer's effort and management, e, and the 
state of nature. Output X is assumed to be a random variable 
with density function g(X;K,e). This implies that output is a 
stochastic function of the inputs provided by the contractor 
and of the producer's effort and management (e). 
The contractor is assumed to solve for the optimal 
compensation C(.) via a standard principal-agent model where 
the solution is viewed as a function of K. The contractor 
then maximizes this solution with respect to K. Formally, the 
contractor is assumed to maximize Z(K) with respect to K, 
where Z(K) equals maximum with respect to C(.) and e of 
III-l JV(X-K-C(.))gdg 
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subject to: 
III-2 J(U(C(.)) - T(e))gdg 
and 
III-3 ;u(C(.))gedg = T'(e). 
The contractor's utility function is V, U is the 
producer's utility function over compensation, and T is the 
producer's utility function over effort and management. The 
contractor may or not be risk-neutral, that is V" < 0, and it 
is assumed that U" < 0 and T' > 0. Constraint (III-2) assures 
the agent of a minimum expected utility since H represents the 
minimum expected utility given a reservation wage in the labor 
market. Constraint (III-3) reflects a restriction that the 
contractor can observe output but not the feeder's effort. 
Consider some specific examples with a risk neutral 
contractor and a risk averse producer. Risk neutrality and 
some simple utility functions will be utilized in order to 
focus on the optimal compensation schedule. The model is: 
III-4 U(.) = 2(C(.))i/2 - e2 
III-5 T(e) = e2 
III-6 X ~ (l/KE)exp(-X/KE). 
Expected output (value of) is thus assumed to be an 
increasing function of investment in productive inputs and the 
producer's effort and management. 
The optimal compensation derived for the model described 
by equations (lli-i) - (III-6) has the form: 
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III-7 C(.) = [(H - e2)/2 + e(X/K)]2. 
In this example, the compensation function is a function 
of X/K, a return on investment formulation. In order for a 
contractor to achieve some level of return on investment, 
production standards such as death loss may be used. In 
addition, there could be a fixed standard for input use, such 
as feed efficiency. As shown in Holmstrom (1979), additional 
information (besides output) which can be observed by both 
parties can be used in constructing the compensation schedule. 
This corresponds well with observed contracts, which often 
have incentives based on feed efficiency. 
Inputs not controlled by the producer are explicitly 
included in the optimal compensation schedule. Furthermore, 
the producer's compensation is inversely related to the inputs 
provided by the contractor, as are the standards of 
production. 
For another example, consider a density function 
III-8 X - (l/(K+e))exp-(X/(K+e)). 
The optimal compensation (derived from equations (III-l) 
through (III-5) and (III-8) is then 
III-9 C(.) = ((H-e2)/2 + e(X-K))2. 
In contrast to previous example, the optimal compensation 
is now a profit sharing contract. It is possible to construct 
numerous examples of optimal compensation schedules by changes 
in the density function, but the main point is that these 
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optimal compensation schedules all explicitly include K, the 
inputs provided by the contractor and outside the control of 
the producer. In general, if e and K interact in production 
(in the examples interaction is through the density function) 
then compensation C(.) will be a function of K. 
The two examples differ markedly when incentives beyond 
the base payment are considered. The first contract offers 
additional incentives if output or input use or both are 
favorable relative to some fixed standard. The second 
contract offers additional incentives through profit sharing. 
In this case, the producer receives a percentage of the 
residual profits of the contractor. The producer's incentives 
and risk include market or price risk in the profit sharing 
contract, as opposed to production risk alone when incentives 
are based on performance relative to some fixed standards. 
Contract Standards, Incentives, and Penalties 
For those contracts that offer production incentives (as 
opposed to profit sharing) an issue for both contractors and 
producers is the fixed standards of output or input use (such 
as death loss allowable or feed efficiency) these incentives 
are based upon. Demski and Feltham (1978) examined a number 
of budget based compensation schedules for a generalized and 
simple contractual situation. They found the optimal 
compensation schedule was characterized by relatively high 
standards. In other words, if the standard is relatively low. 
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the effort is also relatively low. This is true in the 
absence of any penalties for not achieving the standard. 
Mirrlees (1974) demonstrated that employing a low standard and 
an extreme penalty for not meeting the standard was optimal. 
These results do not conflict with each other in that the 
key is the penalty for not achieving production standards. 
Pork production contracts, in general, contain some penalty 
clauses in the compensation schedule. Usually these penalties 
result in the sharing of expenses due to excessive death loss 
(excessive meaning relative to a production standard). 
Whether or not these types of penalties are sufficiently 
extreme is doubtful, since the severity of the penalty is 
dependent on the producer's cash flow requirements. For those 
producers with principal and interest payments on facilities 
to meet, loss of incentive payments and penalties may well be 
a strong motivational factor. For those producers with 
existing facilities that have not been modified for the 
contract and have incurred no debt, this may not be the case. 
However, there are in fact much more severe penalties 
implicitly contained in contracts that would affect any 
producer who wishes to maintain a contractual arrangement, 
regardless of debt obligations. 
One such penalty is the timing of the delivery of the 
contractor's swine. Many contracts contain no explicit terms 
as to when animals are delivered, which gives the contractor 
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total control as to time and number of animals delivered 
(Long, 1989). 
Another implicit penalty is contained in the length of 
the contract and in termination clauses. If the contract is 
for one year with option of renewal, the termination of the 
contract could act as a penalty for those producers not 
meeting the contractor's expectations. In addition, if the 
contract contains specific termination clauses which can be 
invoked before the contract length expires, this could be used 
as a penalty. These penalties would seem to be effective to 
the extent that a producer wishes to maintain a contractual 
agreement. 
These penalties have an impact on the optimal 
compensation schedule. Demski and Feltham (1978) conclude 
that, in general, a standard or budget based contract is not a 
Nash equilibrium without some enforcement mechanism. The 
implication is that a contractor has a unilateral incentive 
not to honor the agreement. This would not be true with legal 
sanctions or a formal multiperiod agreement. This would, in 
turn, mitigate or eliminate any inducement from the penalties 
just discussed. 
Implications of the Model for Actual Contracts 
These examples differ in the form of the optimal 
compensation schedules derived. The form of an optimal 
compensation depends on the underlying parameters and it is 
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not likely that either contractors or producers know these 
parameters. Also, the principal-agent theory tends to lead to 
some very complex fee functions. This is the case for the 
model used above, despite some restrictive assumptions. The 
compensation functions derived suggest that the way output is 
divided between the producer and the contractor would depend 
on the probability distribution of exogenous factors, the 
relation between effort and output, the risk attitudes of both 
parties, and reservation utility levels specifically accounted 
for within the compensation function. In fact, the pork 
production contracts that are in use are much simpler, 
although the optimal compensation schedules do bear a general 
resemblance to the form of actual contracts in that both 
contain base payments, production incentives, and profit 
sharing. The optimal compensation schedules are based on the 
same utility functions, yet the form of the optimal 
compensation schedule can be either production based or 
contain an element of profit sharing. The returns and risks 
associated with each of these types of contracts are very 
dissimilar, yet both were found to be optimal. Despite these 
weaknesses, the model does have some implications for actual 
contracts and how these contracts should be structured. 
The level of the producer's effort and management affects 
the level of output, death loss, and feed efficiency, but not 
unambiguously because production is also governed by other 
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elements. Thus, a contract should depend upon observable 
output and any other information which distinguishes 
fluctuations in output from the producer's level of effort. 
The fluctuations in output also depend on the quality and 
quantity of inputs provided by the contractor. 
In practice, some contracts explicitly recognize this and 
incorporate this type of information into the compensation 
schedule. Some feeder pig contracts in use distinguish 
between "farm fresh pigs" (delivered directly from another 
farm) and "terminal pigs" (purchased at auction from different 
sources). In these contracts the contractor absorbs all death 
losses up to 4 percent for farm fresh pigs and up to 6 percent 
for terminal pigs. The standard of production reflects the 
different quality of the contractor inputs, and the 
relationship is an inverse one as derived in the optimal 
compensation schedule. 
Some pork production contracts in use do not 
differentiate between feeder pigs and their sources. One 
option for producers in these cases is to renegotiate the 
compensation schedule as above. Another option is to give the 
producer the right to reject the pigs at time of delivery. 
This may not be economically efficient in light of the 
contractor's costs following such a rejection (Long, 1989). A 
compromise might be to allow the producer to reject or accept 
the pigs based on their source or sources. 
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before any delivery is made. 
Another result of the model was that, regardless of the 
form of the compensation, K, the contractor's input, was 
inversely related to the optimal level of compensation. In an 
Iowa State University study (Kliebenstein, et. al., 1989) a 
number of contracts were examined and compared. One contract 
in particular offered better returns than other similarly 
structured contracts. However, discussions with producers and 
€ 
contractors indicated that, in practice, the higher 
compensation levels this contract offered were not achieved by 
producers because or poor quality pigs, high death losses, and 
lower feed efficiency. In essence, the analysis assumed 
similar quality of contractor inputs for all contracts, when 
in fact the contract offered higher compensation for lower 
quality inputs. If this fact were known before a producer 
entered into the contract this is not a problem. If not, then 
the contract should include provisions for this inverse 
relationship. 
These recommendations take into account the fact that the 
contractor has actions available that affect the level of 
output. It can also be argued that the contractor's concern 
about long run profits would induce this individual to provide 
adequate inputs or to account for the level of contractor 
inputs provided in a compensation schedule. This is true if 
the contractor's objectives are long term in nature and to the 
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extent that reputations are important in pork contract 
production. Otherwise there exists incentives for the 
contractor to provide lower levels of inputs and claim that an 
unfavorable state of nature has occurred or let the producer 
bear the unfavorable consequences. This in turn shifts more 
risk to the feeder without additional compensation and places 
the feeder into a situation of responsibility without control, 
which is not optimal or even satisfactory. 
The principal-agent model used here does provide some 
implications for the actual terms of a pork production 
contract. The most important implication is the compensation 
schedule derived, which is much more complex than actual 
contracts. Rather, it would seem that an optimal contract in 
practice could use a relatively simple compensation schedule. 
The complexity of this type of contract should be in the 
explicitly stated duties, rights, and responsibilities of all 
parties. This would seem to be lacking in many contracts 
currently in use. The problem then becomes an economic issue 
that goes beyond the usual boundaries of economic analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
OF PORK PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 
Pork production contracts have been touted as a means of 
risk sharing and reducing risk (Zearing and Seals, 1989; 
Kliebenstein et. al., 1989; Roy, 1972; Futrell, 1989). 
However, little work has been done in this area to examine the 
magnitude of risk sharing and risk reduction available through 
contracting. The framework used to examine risk has been 
partial budgeting with sensitivity analysis. This research 
has provided information on how individual factors can affect 
returns, but has not developed any risk profiles of 
contracting. The current state of economic and financial 
analysis of pork production contracts is thus based on simple 
budgeting methods with ad hoc risk assessment. 
Given that the majority of producers who contract do so 
for reasons of reduced capital requirements, financial risk, 
and price risk, a framework is needed to identify the risk 
among contractual alternatives available and contractual risk 
relative to independent ownership. 
Concepts of Risk 
As already indicated, producers who contract do so 
primarily because of financial reasons and price risk. In 
order to develop a framework for evaluating the impact of 
contract production on these factors it is necessary to refine 
these concepts so that they can be evaluated without resort to 
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ad hoc analysis. 
Gabriel and Baker (1980) present a conceptual framework 
of total risk broken down into components of business risk and 
financial risk. They define business risk as the risk 
inherent in the firm, independent of the way the firm is 
financed. Applying this concept to the agricultural firm they 
identify two major sources of business risk. One source is 
the price variability for both outputs and inputs and the 
other source is yield or production variability. These 
sources of risk are reflected in the variability of net cash 
flow or net operating income. Low business risk is associated 
with a low coefficient of variation and a high business risk 
is associated with a high coefficient of variation. 
Financial risk is defined to be the added variability of 
net cash flows that accrue to equity suppliers. The source of 
financial risk is the debt servicing requirements associated 
with borrowing or using debt capital. 
Wilson and Gunderson (1985) provide an explicit 
decomposition of total risk (TR) into business risk (BR) and 
financial risk (PR). Net cash flows before debt payments 
(NCFB) are defined as: 
n 
IV-1 NCFB = S(Pi - Ci)Xi - F 
i=l 
where P is the price received for the ith product, C is the 
variable cash costs of producing that product, X represents 
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the amount of ith product produced, and F is the fixed cash 
cost (excluding debt) that must be paid annually. Net cash 
flows after debt payments (NCFA) but before taxes are 
expressed as: 
IV-2 NCFA = NCFB - P - I 
with P and I representing annual principal and interest 
payments respectively. Using a and the subscript n to 
represent the standard deviation in NCFB, the risk components 
can be written as: 
IV-3 TR = On/NCFA 
IV-4 BR = On/NCFB 
IV-5 FR = CTjj/NCFA - a^ /NCFB. 
Equation (IV-5) expresses the financial risk measure as a 
residual value obtained from subtracting business risk from 
total risk. This formulation assumes that increased levels of 
debt do not alter business risk. Equation (IV-5) can be 
manipulated to form an expression which shows that financial 
risk is a multiplicative function of business risk, 
IV-6 FR = a^ /NCFB • (P+I)/NCFA 
indicating that the level of financial risk is determined by 
the variability in prices and yield as well as the level of 
debt financing. 
A similar analytical model can be used to examine 
business and financial risk for a given pork production 
contract if equation (IV-l) is modified. Consider a contract 
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which provides a base payment (a) per pig and production 
incentives (p^  or Pj) relative to fixed standards. Equation 
(IV-1) can be rewritten as 
n 
IV-7 NCFB = Sax + Pi(X-Xg) + pwij^ -lg) - - F 
i=l 
where Xg is a standard for output, is input use, Ig is a 
standard for input use, and is labor cost. Production 
incentives are paid when the feeder performs better than the 
standards. For a feed efficiency standard, the incentive 
would be paid when pounds of feed per pound of gain is less 
than the production standard in the contract. 
A comparison of equations (IV-1) and (IV-7) readily 
provides some ideas about risk sharing under independent 
ownership versus contracting for a producer. For the contract 
(IV-7) variability of NCFB is dependent only on production 
variability and input use, relative to fixed standards. 
Except for labor, both input and output variability are 
absorbed by the contractor. If a particular contract contains 
provisions that detail quality and timing of inputs provided 
by the contractor and the duration of the contract, then it 
would seem that a great deal of business risk sharing is 
available through a contractual arrangement. For a given 
compensation schedule the payoff or return for particular 
output and input levels is clearly defined and available to 
the producer in advance. 
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The tradeoff for the producer from this type of risk 
sharing is a reduction in average cash flows (NCFB). The 
producer also shares management responsibilities with the 
contractor and thus loses some freedom of action as long as 
the contractual arrangement is maintained. Whether or not 
this is a negative tradeoff is dependent on the producer and 
the field manager representing the contractor. Some contract 
producers have indicated they prefer this shared 
responsibility and that it provides access to improved 
management. Other contract producers have indicated that one 
of the major problems they have had is working with the 
contractor's field managers. 
How does a contractual arrangement affect financial risk? 
Jolly (1983) indicates that specific risk management 
strategies will frequently be interdependent and that would 
seem.to be true for a contractual arrangement. Assuming 
similar size of facilities and debt service requirements for 
both independent ownership and contracting, the change in 
business risk could increase, decrease, or not affect 
financial risk. However, the assumption of similar levels of 
debt service for independent ownership and contracting is a 
poor one to the extent that an independent owner finances 
livestock, feed, and other inputs with debt capital. The 
contract producer does not have to provide these inputs and 
this would have an impact on NCFA and debt service 
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requirements (P+I). The impact on financial risk and total 
risk depends on the magnitude of changes in NCFA and principal 
and interest payments. 
This interaction between business risk and financial risk 
may also have implications for the choice of size of 
facilities, total investment, and the use of debt capital in 
both independent ownership and contracting. For example, 
assume the contractual arrangement reduces business risk and 
debt service requirements. Also assume that the risk 
balancing hypothesis of Gabriel and Baker (1980) holds so that 
there is a total risk constraint, which is equal for both the 
contract producer and the independent owner. A contract 
producer in this situation might use more leverage (hence 
greater capital is available) and build larger facilities 
while maintaining the same total risk as the independent 
owner. 
The framework also allows analysis of another aspect of 
business and financial risk which is unique to contractual 
arrangements. The contracts examined in Zearing and Seals 
(1989) and Kliebenstein et. al. (1989) were actually one year 
contracts with options for renewal. If a producer builds or 
modifies a facility in order to enter into a contractual 
arrangement and finances all or part of this with debt 
capital, this debt will likely be amortized on an intermediate 
or long term basis. These terms of the contract and the loan 
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allocate risk to the producer and to the producer's lender in 
that they face the possibility that the contract (which is the 
main source of loan repayment) may be terminated and the 
facilities unoccupied. 
The problem then becomes how to incorporate a stochastic 
project life into the calculation of mean and variance (or 
standard deviation). Furthermore, it is necessary to examine 
the magnitude of the errors included in analysis of a contract 
by the incorrect assumption that the contract's duration (N) 
is constant. To address these problems an operational 
procedure is needed to allow analysts to consider N 
stochastic. 
Van Home (1977) suggested a probability tree approach in 
which project life is stochastic, but the number of estimates 
required hinders implementation. For example, a three-state, 
ten year project requires more than 150,000 estimates. 
However, the same framework that was used to examine risk can 
be modified to account for this problem, with the only 
information required when N is stochastic is the probability 
distribution of N. 
Statistical Background for Stochastic Contract Duration 
For purposes of analyzing the impact of a stochastic N on 
business and financial risk, the mean and variance will be 
examined initially (for mathematical convenience). From this 
analysis the impact on standard deviation can be easily 
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derived. 
The potential error that may be introduced by assuming N 
is constant when N is actually stochastic can be analyzed by 
comparing the calculations of the mean and variance of the sum 
of N variables when N is certain and when N is stochastic. 
Let 
IV-8 XT = Xi + X2 + ... + nE(X) 
where X^ , Xg,..., are independent and identically distributed 
stochastic variables. If N is constant, the associated mean 
and variance are 
n 
IV-9 EfX?] = E[SXi] = nE[X] 
i=l 
n 
IV-IO a^ (X^ ) = a2(SXi) = ne^ fx). 
i=l 
However, if N is a nonnegative integer-valued stochastic 
variable independent of the 's, the associated mean and 
variance, as given by Ross (1972) and Parzen (1963) are 
N 
IV-11 EtXçp] = E[SX^ ] = E[N]E[X] 
i=l 
N 
IV-12 ^^ (Xt) = a2(ZXi) = E[N]a(X) + E(X)2a2(N). 
i=l 
If E(N) = n, the E[X] is the same when N is constant and 
when N is stochastic. However, a comparison of equations 
(IV-10) and (IV-12) indicates that the variance of X is biased 
downward by a factor of E[X]^ a^ (N) if N is assumed to be 
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constant when N is stochastic. The magnitude of the bias may 
be considerable. 
The analysis can be easily extended to the more general 
case of nonindependent and nonidentical cash flow 
distributions. 
Contract simulation for Finishing Feeder Figs 
In order to illustrate the theoretical concepts of 
business risk and financial risk, the production records used 
in Bearing and Seals (1989) is utilized to calculate risk and 
return for independent ownership and for two pork production 
contracts in a finishing enterprise. Contract A offers a 
$5.50 base payment per head plus $.30 per head for each 
incremental reduction of .1 pounds fed per pound of gain below 
a feed efficiency of 4.5. Contract B offers a $8.50 base 
payment per head plus $.25 per head for each incremental 
reduction of .1 pounds fed per pound of gain below a feed 
efficiency of 3.3. 
The production records used in Bearing and Seals (1989) 
are from North Carolina State University's Production and 
Financial Summary, Swine Development Center for the years 1979 
through 1986. The production records are for an independent 
producer. Since a data base for contract producers' records 
does not exist, the payment schedules for the two contracts 
above were imposed on these production records and measures of 
return and risk were then calculated for this study. Table 
43 
IV-1 presents information on net cash flows before and after 
debt service, standard deviation of NCFB, and debt service 
requirements for ownership and the two contracts. 
The expected risk and return tradeoff for ownership and 
contracting is evident in this situation. Average ownership 
cash flows before and after debt service are higher than for 
either contract but also show greater variability. The debt 
service requirements, which assume 100 percent of all 
operating costs and facilities, reflect the reduced levels of 
investment necessary under a contractual arrangement as 
opposed to ownership. 
Table IV-2 presents calculations of total risk, financial 
risk, and business risk for the three alternatives, based on 
Table IV-1 and equations IV-3, IV-4, and IV-7. Total risk is 
more than halved under the contractual arrangements, as is 
financial risk, when compared to ownership. Business risk is 
reduced even more, as the contracts reduce this type of risk 
to about a fourth of the business risk under the ownership 
alternative. 
Stochastic Contract Duration 
Zearing and Seals (1989) indicate that a contract 
incentive for producers is the ability to meet their debt 
service requirements for facilities. The analysis presented 
above indicates that contract arrangements do offer reductions 
in risk and offer sufficient cash flow to meet debt service 
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requirements. However, this analysis assumes that the length 
of the contract (N) is constant and equal to the term of the 
loan for facilities. In fact, many pork production contracts 
have a duration of one to three years with options for 
renewal, whereas the debt service requirements are determined 
by an intermediate or long term loan of greater duration. 
Thus, the producer and lender are relying on a short term 
arrangement (the contract) as a source of repayment for an 
intermediate or long term liability. 
In order to illustrate the impact of a stochastic 
contractual life on risk, assume the expected life of the 
contract (E(N)) is equal to the actual duration of the 
contract (n). The mean values of NCFB and NCFA (the expected 
returns) for both contracts thus do not change. Assume the 
equals 3, or the variance of the duration of the contract is 
three years. Using the same contracts as before, Table IV-3 
shows the impact of this assumption on the contract risk and 
returns, using equation IV-12 to calculate variance. If the 
producer is relying on the contractual arrangement exclusively 
to generate cash flow the impact on risk is considerable. The 
standard deviation of NCFB for both contracts is now greater 
than that of ownership and the contracts offer lower returns. 
Under this assumption of stochastic contract duration the 
contracts offer lower returns and higher risk. The increased 
risk impacts on total risk, business risk, and financial risk. 
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The implication of these results is that the contracts are not 
a successful risk sharing mechanism, since accepting lower 
returns and higher risk is not a choice many producers would 
accept. This implication is valid to the extent that a 
contractual arrangement is relied upon as a source of revenue 
and capital for the producer. The increased financial and 
business risk reflected in Table IV-3 is based on the 
assumption that the producer's facilities will be empty if the 
contract is terminated before its expected duration. This 
increased risk is overstated if alternatives to a terminated 
contract exist. These alternatives might include other 
contracts or independent ownership of pigs in the system. 
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Table IV-1. Risk and return per head for pork contracts 
Owner Contract Contract 
A B 
NCFB $19.03 $5.73 $5.54 
CTj, $ 8.60 $0.65 $0.57 
NCFA $ 4.39 $0.88 $0.69 
P+I $14.64 $4.84 $4.85 
Table IV-2. Risk measures for pork production contracts 
Owner Contract Contract 
A B 
Total Risk* 1.93 .74 .82 
Financial Risk^  1.48 .63 .72 
Business Risk® .45 .11 .10 
T^otal Risk = (jj^ /NCFA. 
B^usiness Risk = aj,/NCFB. 
F^inancial Risk = ajj/NCFB • (P+I)/NCFA. 
Table IV-3. Risk and return for pork production contracts 
(stochastic contract duration) 
Owner Contract Contract 
A B 
NCFB $19.03 $5.73 $5.54 
Oj, $ 8.60 $10.73 $10.63 
NCFA $ 4.39 $0.88 $0.69 
P+I $14.64 $4.85 $4.85 
Total Risk 1.93 12.44 15.42 
Financial Risk 1.48 10.53 13.50 
Business Risk .45 1.91 1.92 
47 
CHAPTER V RISK ANALYSIS OF PORK PRODUCTION CONTRACTS 
A Pork Enterprise Simulation Model 
A weakness of the model used in the previous chapter is 
its reliance upon the coefficient of variation for the 
measurement of risk. One problem with this approach is that 
the coefficient of variation has little meaning if the mean 
value of cash flows is negative. Another problem is in the 
interpretation of the coefficient of variation as a measure of 
risk. For example, if it is said that contracting reduces 
financial risk by 50 percent, how is this to be interpreted? 
It is likely that this means that the probability of achieving 
a positive net cash flow after debt service is increased, but 
by how much? The only way to give meaning to this statement 
is by examining net cash flow after debt service and checking 
if it is positive for any given year or over a number of 
years. A procedure that analyzes the entire distribution of 
simulated cash flows would seem to be more informative. This 
information could then be interpreted in such a way so as to 
describe the probability that cash flow is greater than a 
specified amount (such as debt service requirements). This 
would provide a better means of evaluating risk and returns. 
Hertz and Thomas (1983) have provided the framework for 
this risk simulation methodology. Probability distributions 
for the variables must be obtained. Each of the distributions 
is then sampled from once. This provides a single value for 
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each of the variables and enables a set of net cash flows, or 
some other performance measures, to be calculated. The 
distributions are then sampled from again and a new value for 
the performance measures is calculated, and so on. 
Eventually, after a large number of samplings from the 
distributions, probability distributions for the performance 
measures are drawn. The essence of this methodology is to 
develop a distribution based approach to decision making and 
to allow decision makers to clearly see the impact of 
sensitivity and uncertainty. 
Anderson and Ikerd (1985) developed an approach to 
distribution based decision analysis for agricultural 
producers. This approach relies on simple probability 
distributions without simulation. This methodology allows 
estimation of the probability that total returns will be 
greater than or equal to variable costs and total costs. 
The model proposed for this study is one based on 
simulation like that of Hertz (1983). However, an attempt is 
also made to make the model accessible to a wide range of 
decision makers. This is done through the utilization of a 
simulation package designed to operate with any spreadsheet 
program. The result is that anyone with a working knowledge 
of spreadsheets and basic probability (similar to the level 
that the Ikerd and Anderson model requires) can perform risk 
analysis based on simulation methods. 
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The model provides an analytical tool for simulating the 
probable impacts of different contracts on a producer's 
profitability, as well as a comparison of contracting and 
independent ownership. The model utilizes a pork enterprise 
template, bub the analyst has the option of using several 
independent probability distributions for output prices, input 
prices, and production performance. Dependence between 
variables is treated as in Anderson and Ikerd (1985), in that 
the analyst is required to specify correlation. 
Feed prices, feeder pig prices, market hog prices, and 
pork production data were used in the model. Average feed, 
feeder pig, and market hog prices were obtained from the 
Marketing Division of the Iowa Department of Agriculture and 
from the USDA for 60 months between January 1985 and December 
1989. Pork production data were obtained from the Iowa State 
University Swine Enterprise Records for the same period. Data 
were collected on feed efficiency, feeder pig death loss, pigs 
weaned per litter, and litters weaned per sow. 
The feeder to finish enterprise used in the model assumes 
a facility for finishing 300 feeder pigs. Initially, total 
investment in facilities and equipment is $22,500 or a 
replacement cost of $75 per pig. A replacement cost of $105 
per pig (or a total investment of $31,500) will also be 
considered in the simulation in order to examine the 
sensitivity of returns and risk to fixed costs. 
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The feeder pig production enterprise assumes a 
confinement facility for 500 sows. Investment in facilities 
is $300,000 or a replacement cost of $600 per sow. 
Risk Analysis of Feeder to Finish Contracts 
Net returns for the feeder to finish enterprise were 
calculated using budgets like that shown in Table V-1. 
Stochastic prices and production efficiency measures are used 
to generate the probability distributions for three contracts 
and for sole proprietorship. The simulation model is run 
simultaneously for each of the arrangements, with contract 
payments and penalties substituted for prices where 
appropriate. Although the focus of this paper is primarily on 
risk and returns to the feeder, returns and risk for the owner 
(contractor) are also generated and evaluated at the same 
time. This is done because a contractual arrangement that is 
unprofitable or excessively risky to the owner is likely to be 
modified or terminated. 
Two of the contracts are fixed payment contracts. These 
contracts transfer price risk from the feeder to the owner. 
In return, the feeder receives a base payment per finished hog 
and additional payments per hog based on achieving different 
levels of feed efficiency and death loss. The other type of 
contract is a profit sharing arrangement. 
Table V-2 presents specific information on the payment 
schedules of the three contracts. Contracts A and B are fixed 
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payment contracts. Contract A offers a lower base payment per 
market hog ($5.50) than does Contract B ($8.50) Under Contract 
A the feeder's compensation depends more on specific death 
loss and feed conversion bonuses. For example, if a finisher 
achieved a zero death loss and a feed conversion of 2.8 lbs. 
of feed per pound of gain, payments per head under Contract A 
(base plus bonuses) would total $13.40, as opposed to a 
payment of $12.75 under Contract B. Conversely, poor 
production efficiency would be penalized more heavily under 
Contract A with its lower base payment and loss of bonuses. 
In addition. Contract A assesses an additional penalty on the 
feeder beyond loss of bonuses if death loss exceeds 4 percent 
of the delivered animals. While both of the above contracts 
are characterized as fixed payment contracts, they will 
generate different distributions of returns for the same 
feeder, because of differences in payment schedules. In 
addition, for different feeders with different levels of 
production efficiency, the interaction of the payment schedule 
for a contract with their actual results will generate 
different distributions of returns. Thus, contracts need to 
be evaluated by feeders based on the payment schedules and 
their expected levels of production efficiency. 
The third contract. Contract C, is a profit sharing 
contract which also includes a base payment of $5.50 per head. 
Any profits, after all expenses (including base payments to 
52 
the finisher) are split equally between the feeder and the 
owner. 
For purposes of evaluating contracts versus complete 
ownership by the feeder, risk and returns are also generated 
for a traditional sole proprietorship. 
Risk Analysis for the Above Average Feeder 
The feeder characterized as above average (relative to 
Iowa Swine Enterprise Records) has an expected death loss of 
2.9% and a feed efficiency of 3.3 pounds of feed per pound of 
gain. This would place this feeder in the top 20 percent of 
the Iowa Swine Enterprise Records. Figure V-l shows the 
distribution function for death loss and Figure V-2 shows the 
distribution for feed efficiency. 
Fixed Payment Contracts for Above Average Feeder 
Table V-3 presents the results from the simulation model 
for each of the contracts and for sole proprietorship. 
Contract A has payments based more on death loss and feed 
efficiency bonuses than Contract B and thus A's returns show 
greater risk or variability. Contract A has an expected 
return to the feeder of $346 (for a group of 300 feeder pigs) 
and a standard deviation of $359. Contract B relies less on 
performance incentives and more on base payments per pig. 
Contract B shows a standard deviation of $201, indicating it 
is less variable than Contract A. Contract B also has an 
expected return of $443. These results show the importance of 
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the interaction between the feeder's production results and 
the compensation schedule for each contract. For the same 
feeder (and a top producer at that) Contract B offers a higher 
return, lower risk, a better minimum expected return, and a 
greater probability of positive returns. This is true even 
though both contracts are characterized as fixed payment 
contracts. 
One major difference in these contracts is that Contract 
A also has a death loss penalty for death loss exceeding 4% of 
delivered animals. This may seem a small difference, but it 
represents additional risk and lower expected returns to the 
feeder. Each of the fixed payment contracts already contains 
an implicit death loss penalty. This is because base payments 
are not received in full for any pig that does not reach 
market weight. The impact of an explicit death loss penalty 
can be seen by examining the results of Contract A* in Table 
V-3. This contract is the same as Contract A except that the 
death loss penalty has been eliminated from the payment 
schedule. This increases expected returns and lowers the 
standard deviation for Contract A*, while maintaining the 
implicit death loss penalty incurred by losing some portion of 
the base payment for pigs not reaching market weight. 
Contract A* also has a lower minimum expected return of 
negative $378 as compared to a minimum expected return of 
negative $1,206 for Contract A and has a 94% probability of 
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achieving positive returns as compared to 82% for Contract A. 
As indicated in Chapter III, the effectiveness of this 
penalty as an incentive for better productivity on the part of 
the feeder depends on the feeder's cash flow requirements and 
the impact of the penalty on the feeder's returns. Implicit 
penalties as an incentive to efficiency already exits in the 
form of lost base payments, loss of the contract, and less 
pigs provided to the feeder by the owner. The theoretical 
model presented in Chapter III proposes that an explicit death 
loss penalty of this sort may be reflective of the owner's 
level of effort and not of the feeder^ s level of effort. In 
other words, is an explicit death loss penalty an incentive to 
the feeder's productivity or is it a means by which the owner 
can pass risk on to the feeder by providing low cost inputs at 
low compensation levels. The model in Chapter III indicates 
that optimal compensation provides for high compensation 
levels for low cost or low quality inputs, thus reflecting the 
feeder's level of effort, not the owner's. This question will 
be answered later in this chapter when the owner's returns and 
the efficient set of contracts are examined. 
Fixed Payment and Profit Sharing Contracts 
Contract C represents a hybrid contract, including a low 
base payment and profit sharing. Thus, the feeder incurs some 
price risk, unlike Contracts A and B. Economic theory 
indicates that there is a trade off between risk and return. 
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and the results for the profit sharing contract follow this 
theory. Contract C offers an expected return of $1,679, much 
higher than Contracts A and B, but has a standard deviation of 
$2,654, indicating much more variability than the fixed 
payment contracts. This profit sharing contract also results 
in a higher maximum expected return and a lower probability of 
achieving a positive return. 
The profit sharing contract has similarities to both 
fixed payment contracts and to a sole proprietorship. Price 
risk is not eliminated in this contract, but is shared with 
the owner. The result is the classic trade off between 
increased expected returns and increased risk. The base 
payment per pig guarantees some returns, but not sufficient to 
achieve positive returns in a period of low prices. 
Comparison of Contracts to Sole Proprietorship 
For many feeders the choice variables on contracting 
include not only choosing a specific contract but also whether 
or not to contract or be an independent producer, bearing all 
production and price risk themselves. To examine these 
choices, returns to a sole proprietor have also been included 
in Table V-3. As expected, the increased risk involved with 
sole proprietorship is associated with higher expected 
returns. The proprietors has an expected return of $3,724 and 
a standard deviation of $6469. The minimum expected return is 
negative $18,305, larger than the minimum for any of the 
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contracts. Although the profit sharing contract also includes 
similar price risk, the impact of the profit sharing contract 
and its base payment can be seen in a lower expected minimum 
return of negative $1,934. 
In choosing among these alternatives a feeder is faced 
with the balancing act of risk and returns. Higher expected 
returns are associated with higher risk with one exception. 
Contract A offers a lower expected return than Contract B yet 
has a higher standard deviation. A simple mean variance 
decision rule would eliminate Contract A from consideration. 
A simple mean variance decision rule would not, however, 
help to choose among the contracts and sole proprietorship. 
One approach to decision making on these contracts would be 
stochastic dominance. This is appropriate since normality of 
the distributions for prices and production variables has not 
been assumed. The simulation model allows results to be 
examined using first-degree (FSE) and second-degree stochastic 
efficiency(SSE). 
Figure V-3 shows the cumulative distribution functions 
for net returns for each of the contracts (A, A*, B, C) and 
for sole proprietorship. This figure graphically illustrates 
contracts as a risk management tool. The contracts have much 
less variability in returns to the feeder and also much 
smaller expected minimum returns than does the sole 
proprietorship. The trade off is that the contracts also 
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offer much lower maximum expected returns and lower expected 
returns. The fixed payment contracts can be seen clustered in 
the middle of the diagram. As long the feeder maintains some 
levels of production efficiency, potential losses will either 
be much smaller than either profit sharing or sole 
proprietorship or may be eliminated altogether as in Contract 
B, which has a minimum expected return of $56. The fixed 
payment contracts, in eliminating price risk, do have limited 
upside potential returns. Since the feeder faces only 
production or biological risk, the maximum returns are also 
limited by biological factors and by the manager's ability. 
No matter how efficient a feeder may be, it will be impossible 
to achieve a death loss any lower than zero and some maximum 
feed efficiency. This places an upper limit on returns to the 
feeder as is shown in Figure V-3. 
. Figure V-4 shows the distributions for the contracts only 
and Figure V-5 shows the distributions for only the fixed 
payment contracts (A, A*, and B). 
The efficient set of choices for this feeder is contract 
B (fixed payment), contract C (profit sharing), and sole 
proprietorship. Contract A is eliminated from the efficient 
set. This contract does not offer sufficient production 
bonuses to offset the higher base payments in Contract B (even 
for.an above average producer) and these same performance 
bonuses increase the risk to the feeder. If these contracts 
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are representative of fixed payment contracts, it appears that 
contracts whose payments are based on performance bonuses more 
so than base payments will need to have substantial bonuses to 
make them competitive. 
Even if the death loss penalty is eliminated from 
Contract A (Contract A*) this contract still does not enter 
into the efficient set. For feeders with lower production 
efficiency levels, the preference for contracts with higher 
base payments (such as Contract B) will probably be even 
stronger. 
Liquidity Considerations for the Above Average Feeder 
As indicated in Chapter I, one of the main reasons why 
pork producers are considering or entering into contracting is 
financial risk, or the inability to meet financial obligations 
as they come due. Like production risk, financial risk will 
vary widely from feeder to feeder, depending on production 
efficiency, amount of debt, debt structure, and price risk. 
Contracts eliminate or modify price risk faced by a feeder, 
but financial risk remains an important element of the 
decision process. The simulation model used to generate these 
results assumes that facilities are completely debt financed 
and amortized over a seven year period. 
Cash flow is estimated by adding depreciation on 
facilities and equipment to returns. For the feeder to finish 
operation, investment was assumed to be $75 per feeder pig or 
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a total of $22,500. Based on a seven year life of the 
facilities, and straight line depreciation, depreciation costs 
are $3,214 per year. Assuming a turnover of 2.6 groups of 
hogs per year, depreciation costs are estimated at $1236 per 
group ($3,214 divided by 2.6 groups per year). Table V-4 
shows the cash flow results for the above average feeder. 
One problem with this model is that it is sensitive to 
the interest rate on the loan. For example, if the loan is 
assumed to be amortized at 10 percent interest over a seven 
year, annual payments would be $4,620 or $1,777 per group 
(based on 2.6 groups per year). If the model is used to 
estimate the probability of being able to meet this payment, 
the riskier alternatives (sole proprietorship and the profit 
sharing contract) appear to be superior in terms of financial 
risk, since they have a higher expected return and thus a 
greater probability of servicing the debt. 
However, this result is misleading in terms of financial 
risk. Consider a risk-averse lender. If the feeder has a 
negative cash flow, the lender would receive nothing. In 
practice the lender would either need to foreclose on the hog 
facilities (typically these facilities are poor collateral) or 
refinance the feeder. If the feeder's cash flow exceeds the 
loan payment, the lender receives only the loan payment and 
does not share in the additional cash flow. The lender is 
indifferent between the size of the firm's positive cash flow 
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above the loan payment, but is concerned for possible losses, 
where cash flow will not service the debt. Thus, the lender 
may be characterized as extremely risk-averse and interested 
in a safety-first arrangement. From this viewpoint, riskier 
alternatives are less desirable. In fact, given a 
safety-first lender, Contract B would be much more desirable. 
Contract B has minimum expected cash flow (Table V-4) of 
$1,185. The profit sharing contract and sole proprietor have 
a minimum expected cash flow less than zero. The probability 
of cash flow exceeding zero for Contract B is 100%. The 
profit sharing contract and sole proprietor have about a 75% 
probability of a positive cash flow. Contract B guarantees 
the lender some repayment on the debt whereas the other-
alternatives do not. 
Rather than deal directly with the problem of interest 
rates, the model assumes both the lender and the feeder are 
interested in generating enough cash flow to meet or exceed 
the depreciation expense of $1,236. This depreciation expense 
is used as a proxy for debt service and does not include a 
specific interest rate. The model then estimates the 
probability of not achieving a cash flow of $1,236. Contract 
B is superior to the other alternatives in that the 
probability of Contract B not generating this cash flow is 
only 3 percent, as seen in Table V-4. This may be compared to 
a probability of 21 percent for the other fixed payment 
61 
contract (Contract A), a probability of 37 percent for the 
profit sharing contract (Contract C), and a probability of 30 
percent for the sole proprietor. 
Financial risk would depend on the interaction between 
the feeder's production efficiency and a particular contract's 
payment schedule. Contract B would seem to be a better 
financial risk management arrangement than Contracts A or C 
or sole proprietorship. If availability of capital is an 
problem for the feeder, this type of analysis may be even more 
important to decisions regarding contracting versus sole 
proprietorship or in choosing among contracts than the 
previous analysis of returns and the efficient set of choices. 
Another liquidity consideration for the feeder and the 
feeder's lender is the duration of the contract. Many 
contracts tend to be one year arrangements with options for 
renewal. For the feeder who finances the facilities this 
entails considerable financial and total risk for both the 
feeder and lender. This issue was examined in the theoretical 
model in Chapter IV, and it was shown that a stochastic 
contract duration increased financial and total risk for the 
feeder. Rather than use the theoretical approach (which 
assumes normal distributions) to analyze this issue, the 
simulation model calculates an expected payback period for 
each alternative. The payback method is used precisely 
because it ignores the prospective life of the investment in 
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facilities. While the life of the facilities is known, the 
horizon of uncertainty associated with the contract is what is 
important to the feeder and lender. The key issue is how long 
will a contract need to be in place to recoup investment in 
facilities or to pay off the loan on facilities. Table V-4 
presents the expected payback in terms of the number of groups 
and in years (assuming 2.6 groups per year). Payback is 
calculated by dividing the expected cash flow for each 
alternative into the cost of facilities ($22,500). This 
provides the number of groups required to recoup the 
investment. The number of years is then calculated by taking 
the number of groups and dividing by 2.6 groups per year. 
Sole proprietorship has the shortest payback period (1.8 
years) because it has the highest expected value. This is 
somewhat misleading in that the minimum expected cash flow for 
this alternative is negative. This rapid payback reflects the 
higher expected return associated with the higher risk for 
sole proprietorship. Only Contract B has an expected minimum 
cash flow greater than zero, and Contract B's minimum expected 
payback is 7.3 years. Again, if financial risk is a key issue 
for the feeder and the lender then Contract B would be 
superior. 
None of the contracts provide a payback of one year or 
less, the contract duration which is guaranteed. Thus, 
contracts may involve substantial financial risk, especially 
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if this is ignored. Assuming the contract duration is the 
same as the life of the facilities or the loan amortization 
period underestimates financial and total risk for the feeder 
and the lender. 
One possible solution to this problem would be a formal 
arrangement between the feeder, the lender, and the owner 
where the the duration of the contract is tied to the term of 
the loan. Another solution to this problem is direct owner 
financing of the facilities. This would give the owner a 
larger stake in the success of the contract, but would also 
increase the owner's investment requirements and risk. 
Risk analysis for the owner 
Table V-5 presents returns to the owner or contractor 
associated with the above average feeder. The fixed payment 
contracts (A and B) offer similar returns and risk. Expected 
returns to the owner exceed expected returns to the feeder for 
these contracts. This reflects the price risk that the owner 
accepts in the contractual arrangement. Contract A does offer 
the owner a higher return, a lower standard deviation, a 
higher maximum expected return, and a lower expected minimum 
than does Contract B. This reflects the additional risk 
passed on to the feeder through reliance on performance 
bonuses rather than base payments. The profit sharing 
contract (C) offers the owner a lower expected return than do 
the fixed payment contracts but also has a lower standard 
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deviation and a lower minimum expected value. This reflects 
the fact that risk is shared with the feeder to a greater 
extent than the fixed payment contracts. 
Figure V-6 shows the distributions of returns for the 
owner for each of the contracts. The efficient set of 
contracts for the owner are Contracts A and C. Contract B is 
not in the efficient set, reflecting the above results for 
risk and returns to the owner. Contracts that rely on 
performance incentives rather than base payments may be 
preferred by the owner since these contracts do pass more risk 
on to the feeder. 
The issue of death loss penalties discussed earlier 
remains. An explicit death loss penalty (such as the one in 
Contract A) may be an incentive for greater productivity on 
the part of the feeder or it may simply be a means of passing 
risk on to the feeder by providing low cost or low quality 
inputs at low compensation levels (contrary to the optimal 
compensation schedule derived in the theoretical model). 
Tables V-3 and V-5 and Figures V-3 and V-6 can provide some 
information towards resolving this issue. Contract A is the 
fixed payment contract with an explicit death loss penalty. 
Contract A* is the same contract except that the death loss 
penalty has been eliminated from the payment schedule. 
Mirrlees (1974) demonstrated that employing an extreme 
penalty for not meeting the standard (in this case the death 
65 
loss standard of 4 percent or less) was optimal in a 
contractual arrangement. Assume that an extreme penalty is 
one which, if eliminated from the payment schedule, would 
place the contract into or out of the efficient set of 
choices. Contract A is not in the efficient set of choices 
for the feeder. Elimination of the explicit death loss 
penalty (Contract A*) does not move Contract A* into the 
efficient set. For the feeder the explicit death loss penalty 
is not an extreme penalty by the above definition. For the 
owner, elimination of the death loss penalty from Contract A 
does not eliminate this contract from the efficient set. 
Again, by the above definition, the death loss penalty is not 
an extreme penalty. If this definition of an extreme penalty 
is acceptable, then it can be concluded that an explicit death 
loss penalty is not an incentive for greater productivity for 
the feeder, but is instead a means by which the owner can 
provide low cost or low quality inputs at low compensation 
levels, contrary to the optimal compensation schedule. This 
indicates that the addition of this type of performance risk 
does little to increase the risk and returns of the feeder 
(and hence productivity) and does little to reduce the risk 
and returns of the owner. In fact, elimination of this type 
of penalty tends to reduce overall variability for both the 
owner and feeder, while not changing the efficient set of 
alternatives. Contracts thus should not necessarily contain 
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explicit death loss penalties. If death loss penalties are 
contained in a contract, then these standards should be tied 
to the quality of the feeder pigs provided by the owner, with 
the feeder having the right to inspect the feeder pigs before 
acceptance of the animals and the accompanying death loss 
standards. 
Risk Analysis for the Below Average Feeder 
The feeder characterized as below average has an expected 
death loss of 4.63 percent and an expected feed efficiency of 
3.64 pounds of feed per pound of gain. Figure V-7 shows the 
distribution function for death loss for the below average 
feeder and Figure V-8 shows the distribution function for feed 
efficiency of the below average feeder. These efficiency 
measures place this feeder in the lower 40 percent of Iowa 
feeders, relative to Iowa Swine Enterprise Records. 
Fixed Payment and Profit Sharing Contracts 
Results for the below average feeder are presented in 
Table V-6. The only change from the above average feeder is 
that the distribution functions for death loss and feed 
efficiency reflect the lower production efficiency of the 
below average feeder. All other information and inputs into 
the model remain the same. 
These results are in contrast to those of the above 
average feeder, again showing the interaction of the 
production efficiency for each feeder with the payment 
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schedules of the contracts. Contract A, which depends more on 
performance bonuses, yields a negative expected return to the 
below average feeder with more variation than for the above 
average feeder. Contract B provides an expected return of 
$172 for the below average feeder, about $270 less than the 
expected return for the above average feeder expected return 
under this same contract. This reflects the implicit 
penalties of lost base payments for this feeder. With 
Contract A, the below average feeder is not able to cover all 
expenses, much less be profitable. This lack of production 
efficiency makes a contract such as A unattractive to a below 
average feeder. 
The profit sharing contract (Contract B) offers the below 
average feeder a much higher expected return of $1,143 with 
only a slightly worse minimum expected return as compared to 
Contract A. Contract B offers a minimum expected return of 
$56, and so is approximately, at worst, a breakeven 
proposition for the below average feeder. 
Figure V-9 shows the distributions of returns for the 
below average feeder. Maximum expected returns for the fixed 
payment contracts (A, B, and A*) are clustered together in the 
graph, indicating returns have a limited upside potential due 
to biological factors. Minimum expected returns for the fixed 
payment contracts are clustered together around zero, 
indicating these contracts do eliminate price risk but not 
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production risk. Figure V-lO shows the distributions for all 
of the contracts, and Figure V-11 shows the distributions for 
fixed payment contracts only. 
The efficient set of choices for the below average feeder 
are Contract B, Contract C (profit sharing), and sole 
proprietorship. Contract B offers a lower expected return, 
lower risk, and a higher minimum expected return than do the 
other alternatives in the efficient set, indicating the 
difficult choice of expected returns versus risk. 
Contract A, with its performance based payments, is 
clearly not a good choice for the below average feeder since 
this contract was not part of the efficient set even for a 
very efficient feeder. Elimination of the explicit death loss 
penalty (Contract A*) does not move this contract into the 
efficient set of alternatives for the below average feeder. 
This indicates that a feeder should carefully consider how 
expected production efficiency interacts with a contract's 
compensation schedule before choosing an alternative. This is 
especially true when evaluating promotion literature for 
contracts, which often seem to offer good returns to the 
feeder, but these returns may be unrealistic considering the 
feeder's actual or expected production efficiency. 
Liquidity considerations for the below average feeder 
Table V-7 shows information regarding cash flow for the 
below average feeder. Cash flow is calculated in the same 
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manner for this feeder as for the above average feeder. The 
profit sharing contract (Contract C) and sole proprietorship 
offer higher expected cash flows than the fixed payment 
contracts (A and B), a similar result to that for the above 
average feeder. However, for the below average feeder profit 
sharing and sole proprietorship offer a lower probability of 
not meeting the depreciation expense than do the fixed payment 
contracts. This is in contrast to the cash flow results for 
the above average feeder where the fixed payment contracts 
offered a lower probability of not meeting the depreciation 
expense. Again assuming this depreciation expense as a proxy 
for any debt service, the below average feeder faces less 
financial risk with contracts that offer higher returns and 
more variability in returns (as opposed to cash flow). This 
is due to the poor production efficiency of this feeder, which 
does not mix well with fixed payment contracts based on 
performance. Contract B does, however, offer a minimum 
expected cash flow of $1,185, whereas the other alternatives 
offer a minimum expected cash flow that is negative, allowing 
for only some or no servicing of the depreciation (debt) 
expense. From the view of a safety-first lender. Contract B 
would still be the best alternative since a lender does not 
share in cash flow above some required debt service. Contract 
B does offer a minimum expected cash flow almost large enough 
to service the depreciation expense. 
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Payback periods are also presented in Table V-7. In this 
case, the payback periods for each alternative are somewhat 
longer for the below average feeder as compared to the above 
average feeder. This reflects the poorer production 
efficiency of the below average feeder and subsequent lower 
expected cash flow. The longer payback periods for the below 
average feeder increase the financial risk associated with a 
contract that is only guaranteed for only one year. 
In addition to this type of increased financial risk, if 
the below average feeder provides lower returns to the owner, 
this feeder may well be more subject to termination of the 
contract or to receiving fewer of the owner's feeder pigs in 
his or her facilities. This will also increase financial risk 
to the below average feeder. Whether or not this is likely 
depends on the owner's returns and how anxious the owner is to 
retain a particular feeder as a party to a contract. 
Risk Analysis for the owner 
Table V-8 presents results from the simulation model for 
the owner associated with the below average feeder. The lower 
production efficiency of this feeder still leaves the owner 
with positive expected returns, although these expected 
returns are lower than is the case where the owner contracts 
with the above average feeder. There is also some additional 
variability for the owner associated with the below average 
feeder and maximum expected returns are slightly lower. 
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Figure V-12 shows the distributions of returns for the 
owner contracting with the below average feeder. The 
efficient set consists of Contract A (fixed payment with 
explicit death loss penalty) and Contract C (profit sharing). 
This is similar to the previous results for the above average 
feeder, except that if the explicit death loss penalty is 
eliminated from Contract A, this contract is not part of the 
efficient set for the owner. In other words, elimination of 
this penalty does increase the risk and lower the returns to 
the owner enough to eliminate Contract A* from the efficient 
set. In this case it could be argued that the death loss 
penalty is an important part of the contract to the owner, 
although this penalty makes no difference to the efficient set 
of the below average feeder. To the extent that optimal 
compensation schedules can be associated with efficient sets, 
this confirms that the optimal compensation schedule is a 
function of factors unique to each party involved in the 
contract. It may also mean that in the case of the below 
average feeder, the explicit death loss penalty may not be 
severe enough and in fact should be even higher. This is 
because the results indicate that the death loss penalty makes 
no difference to the below average feeder's efficient set, but 
does impact on the owner's efficient set. 
Previously it was speculated that the below average 
feeder may be subject to more financial risk than the above 
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average feeder because of a greater likelihood that an owner 
would terminate a below average feeder's contract. This was 
due to the lower expected returns and greater risk for the 
owner contracting with a below average feeder. A comparison 
of the owner's efficient set over both feeders will provide 
some information regarding this termination issue. The 
efficient set for the owner contracting with the above average 
feeder consists of Contract A and Contract C (profit sharing). 
(Contract A* was also part of this efficient set, but will be 
ignored for purposes of comparison.) The efficient set for 
the owner associated with the below average feeder was also 
Contract A and Contract C. Examining the distributions of the 
owner's returns for all of these contracts together using 
stochastic dominance yields an efficient set consisting only 
of Contracts A and C associated with the above average feeder. 
The difference in production efficiency and consequent change 
in returns to the owner does impact upon the efficient set. 
The owner will likely prefer a contract with the more 
efficient producer, if the decision is based upon risk and 
returns. The below average feeder would thus be more subject 
to termination of a contract, everything else being equal. 
The below average feeder would also likely receive fewer 
feeder pigs from an owner with a choice between feeders and 
might also receive lower quality (and less expensive) feeder 
pigs. These factors would tend to lower the below average 
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feeder's returns and increase financial risk even more than 
just the difference in production efficiency. The interaction 
of the feeder's production efficiency and the compensation 
schedule of the contract also impacts upon the owner. The 
likelihood of termination of a contract by the owner or less 
feeder pigs provided to a feeder would also depend on the 
availability of alternative feeders to contract with and the 
amount of competition among owners for finishing facilities. 
It is also possible that a contract with the below average 
feeder would be more subject to revision in the owner's favor 
to make the owner's expected returns and risk comparable to 
the arrangement with the above average feeder. 
Sensitivity Analysis of Feeder to Finish Contracts 
One aspect of pork production contracts that has not been 
discussed in the literature is the issue of operating 
leverage. Operating leverage refers to the existence of fixed 
costs in a firm's cost structure. Operating leverage may be 
calculated by dividing fixed costs by total costs. An 
increase in this ratio indicates higher fixed charges for a 
firm. In general, higher fixed charges mean greater fixed 
cost commitments that have to be met even if sales volume or 
total revenue decline. This situation implies greater risk 
for a firm because these fixed cost commitments cannot be 
reduced to meet declining sales volume or total revenue. 
In comparing pork production contracts with sole 
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proprietorship, operating leverage should be higher for the 
pork production contracts. This is because most of the 
variable costs associated with pork production (feed costs, 
veterinarian costs, feeder pig costs, death loss costs, and 
marketing costs) are borne by the owner. The feeder is left 
with a cost structure consisting of variable labor costs and 
fixed costs for facilities. The model used in this study 
assumes that fixed costs for facilities are the same for both 
the contract feeder and the sole proprietor. Thus operating 
leverage must increase for the contract feeder. If operating 
leverage increases, the feeder's returns should be very 
sensitive to changes in sales volume and total revenue. 
Another way of examining this issue is to explore the 
sensitivity of risk and returns to changes in fixed costs for 
the feeder. In order to do this, the simulation model was set 
to evaluate risk and returns for two different levels of 
investment. The first level of investment in facilities 
sufficient to finish 300 feeder pigs was set at $22,500 (or 
$75 replacement cost per head). This assumption gave a fixed 
cost of $1,236 per group. The second level of investment was 
set at a replacement cost of $105 per head (or a total 
investment of $31,500). Based on the same depreciation and 
turnover assumptions as before, this level of investment gives 
the feeder a fixed cost of $1,731 per group. On a per group 
basis the higher level of investment means an increase in 
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fixed cost for the feeder of $495. On a per head basis, the 
investment in facilities has been increased from $75 per head 
to $105 per head, a difference of $30. The $30 increase can 
be thought of as a reflection of widely varying types of 
feeder pig finishing facilities and construction costs. The 
$30 increase in investment should not reflect widely varying 
production efficiency levels due to differences in facilities, 
however, and so avoids the question of relating production 
efficiency with facilities. This assumption implies that the 
risk and returns of the owner will not be affected since there 
is no change in the production efficiency of the feeder due to 
investment in facilities. 
Table V-9 provides a comparison of risk and returns for 
the above average feeder for the two levels of investment. 
For each alternative, expected return, maximum return, and 
minimum return are simply reduced by the increased fixed cost 
of $495. Standard deviation remains the same for each 
alternative. The efficient set with an increased investment 
remains for the above average feeder and consists of contract 
B (fixed payment), contract C (profit sharing), and sole 
proprietorship. 
There are, however, some important changes in the risk 
and returns of the fixed payment contracts. Contract B, for 
example, now has a negative expected return and a negative 
minimum return due to the increased fixed costs. The 
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probability of a return greater than zero is reduced from 100 
percent ($75 investment per head) to 34 percent ($105 
investment per head). The most significant change due to the 
increased in fixed costs lies in the area of financial risk. 
At a $75 investment level, cash flows from the fixed payment 
contracts offered a very good probability of meeting the fixed 
costs of $1,236 (this figure was also used as a proxy for debt 
service). This result would be attractive to a feeder and a 
lender interested in meeting debt service requirements. 
However, increasing fixed costs by $495 increases the 
probability of not meeting debt service requirements by a 
substantial amount. Contract B now offers the feeder and 
lender a 78 percent chance of not meeting the fixed costs of 
$1,731, as opposed to only a 3 percent chance with a $75 per 
head investment. This result is also reflected in the payback 
periods for the fixed payment contracts, which would now 
exceed the presumed 7 year life of the facilities (and the 7 
year maturity of the loan for facilities). These results 
reflect the sensitivity of the fixed payment contracts to an 
increase in fixed costs and operating leverage. This can be 
contrasted to the small changes in payback period and the 
probability of not meeting debt service requirements for the 
profit sharing (contract C) and sole proprietorship 
alternatives. Given the above results for financial risk and 
the payback period, the feeder would have some difficulty in 
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paying for facilities and replacing these facilities. 
Table V-10 shows a similar comparison of the impact of 
increased fixed costs for the below average feeder. The 
changes in risk and returns for the below average feeder are 
similar to those for the above average feeder. Increased 
operating leverage impacts much more upon the fixed payment 
contracts than upon the profit sharing contract and sole 
proprietorship. The problem of paying for facilities and 
replacing these facilities becomes even more acute for the 
below average feeder with the higher investment in facilities. 
With the increased fixed costs, both the above and 
below average feeders face a difficult choice of expected 
returns versus risk, as do the lenders for both of the 
operations. Investment levels in facilities must be carefully 
monitored by all producers as the contracts provide a thin (if 
any) margin of safety. Higher levels of investment in 
facilities should only be considered if the feeder is 
reasonably assured that this will provide increases in 
production efficiency. 
Risk Analysis of Feeder Pig Production Contracts 
Net returns for the feeder pig production enterprise are 
calculated using budgets like that shown in Table V-11. 
Probability distributions are substituted into the budget for 
prices, pigs weaned per litter, and litters weaned per sow per 
year. Contract payment schedules are substituted for the 
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price of feeder pigs for two feeder pig production contracts. 
The simulation model is run simultaneously for each of the 
contracts and for sole proprietorship and generates 
information about returns and risk for both the feeder and the 
owner. Two feeder pig producers are represented in the model. 
One producer is characterized as an above average feeder and 
the other is characterized as below average. 
The size of the feeder pig production enterprise is 
assumed to be 500 sows. Production of feeder pigs and returns 
are calculated on an annual basis. Investment in facilities 
and equipment is $600 per sow. 
Both of the feeder pig production contracts are fixed 
payment contracts. These type of contracts entail that all 
price risk is taken on by the owner, not the feeder. In 
return, the feeder receives a fixed payment for each feeder 
pig produced. The feeder also receives fixed payments for 
each sow present in the breeding herd each month in one of the 
contracts, but not in the other contract. 
Table V-12 describes the payment schedules of the two 
contracts and the responsibilities of both parties. Contract 
A directs the feeder to supply facilities, labor, veterinary 
costs, and utilities. The owner supplies breeding stock, 
feed, and marketing of animals. Compensation is $14 per 
feeder pig produced. 
Contract B directs the feeder to provide facilities, 
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labor, and utilities. The owner supplies breeding stock, 
feed, veterinary costs, and marketing of animals. 
Compensation for the feeder is $12 per feeder pig produced. 
In addition, the feeder receives $10 per female present in the 
breeding herd each month. 
The structure of these compensation schedules is much 
simpler than that of the feeder pig finishing contracts. 
There are no other performance bonuses beyond the base 
payments. The only penalties for poor production efficiency 
on the part of the feeder are implicit ones, in that the loss 
of a feeder pig (or of a sow in one contract) means the loss 
of the base payment that otherwise would have been received. 
In evaluating these contracts the model examines the 
interaction of the feeder's production efficiency with the 
payment schedule of the contract. Different levels of 
production efficiency will generate different risk and returns 
distributions within the same payment schedule for both the 
feeder and the owner. 
Risk Analysis for the Above Average Feeder 
The expected number of pigs weaned per litter for the 
above average feeder is 9.1 and the expected litters weaned 
per sow is 2.1. The distributions of these variables are 
presented in Figures V-13 and V-14 respectively. These 
distributions combined with the number of sows in the breeding 
herd gives this feeder an annual expected output of 9,338 
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feeder pigs. The distribution of the number of feeder pigs 
produced annually is shown in Figure V-15. The number of pigs 
weaned per litter and the expected litters per sow place this 
feeder in the top 25 percent of Iowa pork producers (relative 
to the Iowa Swine Enterprise Records). 
Results for the above average feeder are shown in Table 
V-13. The results indicate a large difference in the returns 
from the two contracts. Although Contract B offers a lower 
payment per feeder pig, it contains an additional incentive of 
payment per sow present in the breeding herd each month. The 
expected return for Contract B is $42,132, about eight times 
the expected return for Contract A. Contract B shows a 
smaller standard deviation, a higher expected maximum return, 
and a smaller minimum expected return than Contract A. 
Although both contracts show the possibility of a negative 
minimum expected return. Contract B has only a 6 percent 
probability of a return less than zero, whereas Contract A has 
a 48% probability of a negative return. Contract B would seem 
to be much superior in terms of risk and return to the feeder. 
Contract B also compares favorably to sole 
proprietorship. Contract B does have a lower expected return, 
but also offers less variability since it has a smaller 
standard deviation. As is the case with most of the contracts 
examined in this paper, the trade off between risk and returns 
is quite evident. Contract B has a higher probability of a 
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positive return than does sole proprietorship and a smaller 
minimum expected return. 
Contract A also offers the feeder a trade off between 
risk and returns when compared to sole proprietorship. 
However, the probability of a positive return for this 
contract is 52 percent and this compares unfavorably with sole 
proprietorship. The explanation for this result lies in the 
fact that the feeder pig production operation has a high level 
of fixed costs. For sole proprietorship, fixed costs of 
facilities are about 33 percent of total costs. This reflects 
the relatively large investment in facilities for feeder pig 
production. Although the contracts eliminate the costs of 
breeding stock and feed, the fixed costs of facilities remain 
in the feeder's budget. Under the contractual arrangements 
fixed costs account for something over 50 percent of the 
feeder's total costs. This implies that the feeder has a high 
degree of operating leverage and this magnifies changes in 
earnings that result from small changes in output of feeder 
pigs. Contract A is especially subject to this type of 
operating risk because payments are received only for feeder 
pigs produced and not for the number of sows in the breeding 
herd. Sole proprietorship has more overall variability in 
returns, but this reflects the price risk the independent 
feeder faces. Figure V-16 shows the distribution functions 
for the two contracts and for sole proprietorship. Maximum 
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returns for the two contracts are clustered together in the 
middle of the graph. This reflects the biological limits on 
the number of feeder pigs produced annually and the resulting 
limit on returns to the feeder. Contract B lies completely to 
the right of Contract A reflecting the additional payment per 
sow contained in Contract B. Figure V-17 shows the 
distribution functions for the two contracts only. The 
efficient set consists of Contract B and sole proprietorship. 
Liquidity Considerations for the Above Average Feeder 
Cash flow for the feeder is calculated by the model by 
adding depreciation on facilities and equipment to returns. 
Depreciation is calculated on a straight line basis over a 
period of seven years. Based on total investment of $300,000, 
depreciation expenses are $42,857 annually. 
Table V-14 presents cash flow results for the above 
average feeder. Contract B has a higher expected cash flow 
than Contract A and less variability. Contract B also has a 
100% probability of a positive cash flow, and the minimum 
expected cash flow for this contract is $25,255. Contract A 
has a 93 percent probability of a positive cash flow but has a 
minimum expected cash flow of negative $23,392. Sole 
proprietorship has a 77 percent chance of a positive cash 
flow. 
Contract B has only a 6 percent probability of not 
meeting the depreciation expense of $42,857, a superior result 
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to either Contract A or sole proprietorship. This fact and 
the 100 percent probability of achieving a cash flow of at 
least $25,255 would make this contract very attractive to a 
feeder concerned with financial risk. A safety-first lender 
would also view these results favorably, probably more so than 
any other alternative. 
Expected payback for Contract B is 3.5 years, less than 
one year longer than the expected payback for sole 
proprietorship. This means that there still exists some 
additional financial risk with Contract B since contracts are 
commonly guaranteed for only one year. Duration of the 
contract is still an important source of financial risk even 
for the most favorable contract. 
Risk Analysis for the Owner 
Given the large differences between expected returns to 
the feeder that exist for Contracts A and Contracts B, it is 
to be expected that large differences will exist for expected 
returns to the owner for these two contracts. Table V-15 
confirms this expectation. Contract A, which is less 
favorable to the feeder than Contract B, offers an expected 
return to the owner of $63,136, almost three times the 
expected return to the owner under Contract B. Both contracts 
offer the owner about the same variability. Contract A also 
has a lower minimum expected return to the owner than Contract 
B. Contract A has a 65 percent probability of a positive 
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return to the owner, higher than that of Contract B at 48 
percent. 
Figure V-18 shows the distributions for the returns to 
the owner. The situation is completely opposite of that for 
the feeder, as Contract A clearly dominates Contract B from 
the owner's perspective. The difference is that the owner 
appears willing to pay the feeder a premium on a per sow 
basis. The owner is clearly trying to protect the breeding 
herd and is willing to pay an incentive to the feeder to do 
so. One possible explanation of this premium comes from the 
theoretical model presented in Chapter III. This model 
derived an optimal compensation schedule which required an 
inverse relationship between the quality of inputs provided by 
the owner and the compensation level. Based on this, it might 
be that this owner is providing poorer quality breeding stock 
to the feeder than provided under Contract A. Detailed 
information on the quality of the breeding stock is not 
available at this time, but this type of information would 
provide an excellent test of the theoretical model's 
implications. 
Another possible explanation for this premium lies in 
the cost of acquiring feeder pigs for the owner. The cost to 
the owner of this additional payment per sow under Contract B 
is approximately $6 per feeder pig. This is a significant 
amount of money to both the feeder and the owner, as it 
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accounts' for the differences in returns to both parties under 
the two contracts. This premium also means that Contract B is 
in the efficient set for the feeder, but is not in the 
efficient set for the owner. Despite this extra premium, the 
cost of feeder pigs to the owner under Contract B is $37 per 
pig, and this is still less than the ten year average 
(1981-1990) cost of $40 per feeder pigs The cost of feeder 
pigs to the owner under Contract A is $32 per pig. Both 
owners are acquiring feeder pigs at a lower cost than the 
average cost of feeder pigs and still have some control over 
the source and quality of these feeder pigs. The owners are 
also assured of a large volume of feeder pigs without a large 
investment in facilities and equipment. 
Still another explanation for this premium can be seen by 
comparing the owner's returns under Contract B to the feeder's 
returns. The feeder's returns exceed the returns to the owner 
with this contract. This is the opposite result from all 
other contracts examined in this study, where the owner's 
returns usually exceed the feeder's returns. The explanation 
for this was that the owner accepts all or most the the price 
risk in marketing, and so is compensated for taking this risk 
with higher expected returns. In the case of feeder pig 
production, the feeder has a large investment in facilities 
and a high level of fixed costs and operating leverage. The 
owner may be trying to compensate the feeder for this 
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investment by adding a premium for each sow in the breeding 
herd. The owner may also be simply willing to pay a premium 
for the type of facilities that he or she desires for the 
breeding herd. In essence the owner is provided with 
excellent facilities at no cost and is able to enjoy very low 
fixed costs and low operating leverage. This would tend to 
balance out the price risk that the owner accepts. It would 
also ensure the owner with a steady supply of feeder pigs at a 
cost below the long term average from a single source with the 
only investment being the cost of the breeding herd to the 
owner. 
If the owner who provides Contract B to a feeder wishes 
for approximately the same return as the owner providing 
Contract A, this would require a premium of only $3.24 per sow 
in the breeding herd per month. 
Risk Analysis for the Below Average Feeder 
The feeder pig producer characterized as below average 
has an expected number of pigs weaned per litter of 8.3 and 
the expected litters weaned per sow is 1.7. The distributions 
of these variables are presented in Figures V-19 and V-20 
respectively. This level of production efficiency provides 
this feeder with an expected annual output of 6,820 feeder 
pigs, about 3000 less pigs per year than the above average 
feeder. These levels of production efficiency place this 
feeder in the lower 25 percent of Iowa pork producers relative 
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to the Iowa Swine Enterprise Records. 
The smaller output of the below average feeder impacts on 
the expected returns of all three alternatives, as seen in 
Table V-16. Contract B is the only alternative with an 
expected greater than zero. This contract also has less 
variability than does Contract A or sole proprietorship. 
Contract B also has a greater probability of achieving a 
positive expected return. The maximum expected return for 
Contract B is $44,688, which is smaller than the maximum 
expected return of $334,368 for sole proprietorship. The 
minimum expected return for all three contracts is negative. 
Contract A is not a good alternative for the below 
average feeder. The expected return is negative $33,531 and 
the maximum expected return is only $5,444, little better than 
breaking even. 
Figure V-21 shows the distributions of returns for the 
below average feeder. Contract B clearly dominates Contract A 
for this feeder, just as is the case for the above average 
feeder. What is different about these results is that the 
efficient set for the below average feeder consists only of 
Contract B. Sole proprietorship is eliminated from the 
efficient set of choices, and this did not occur for any of 
the contracts previously examined. In this sense Contract B 
represents the best alternative by itself. This occurs 
because sole proprietorship has a negative expected return and 
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a more negative minimum expected return. Contract B offers 
the feeder a higher return at less risk, and so stands alone 
in the efficient set. Maximum expected returns for this 
contract are still less than maximum expected returns for sole 
proprietorship. This reflects the biological limits on the 
number of feeder pigs that can be produced with a given number 
of sows and the elimination of price risk under this contract. 
Even though Contract B stands alone in the efficient set 
of the below average feeder it is probably not the solution to 
any profitability or financial problems the feeder may have. 
This feeder still has very low levels of production efficiency 
and it remains to be seen how this impacts upon the returns to 
the owner. If this contract is unprofitable to the owner it 
stands a good chance of being terminated or modified. This 
issue will be examined further when risk analysis for the 
owner is discussed. 
Liquidity Considerations for the Below Average Feeder 
Cash flow results for the below average feeder are 
presented in Table V-17. All three alternatives have a 
positive expected cash flow. Contract B looks to be the most 
favorable alternative as it has the highest expected cash flow 
of the three alternatives and has a 100 percent probability of 
of exceeding zero. The minimum expected cash flow for this 
contract is $19,944, offering both the feeder and a lender a 
good chance of being able to service some debt on a consistent 
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basis. Contract B also has a lower probability of not being 
able to service the depreciation expense of $42,857. Payback 
for Contract B is actually lower than that of sole 
proprietorship, again a different result from previous 
contracts and feeders examined. 
Risk Analysis for the Owner 
Although Contract B is the best alternative for the 
feeder, the viability of this arrangement also depends on the 
results for the owner, since an unprofitable contract (from 
the owner's point of view) may be subject to termination or 
modification. Table V-18 presents the results for the owner 
associated with the below average feeder. As was the case 
with the above average feeder. Contract A offers the owner a 
higher return with comparable risk when compared to Contract 
B. Figure V-22 shows the distributions of returns to the 
owner, and Contract A dominates Contract B. The major 
difference for the owner associated with the below average 
feeder is that Contract B now provides an expected return of 
negative $17,754. In addition, the cost of feeder pigs for 
the owner is now $43 per pig, above the ten year average price 
of feeder pigs of $40. The owner now has a contract with an 
expected sizeable loss and the feeder pigs are somewhat more 
expensive than average. Unless the owner is willing to pay a 
premium above and beyond that already being paid for single 
source feeder pigs, the viability of the contract is in debt. 
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It is doubtful that the owner would be willing to pay this 
premium if alternative feeders (such as the above average 
feeder) were available to contract with. In this case the 
contract may be terminated, modified in favor of the 
contractor, or, possibly, the owner will undertake to improve 
the feeder's production efficiency. Any improvement in the 
feeder's production efficiency will benefit both parties, as 
can be seen by comparing the results for the above average and 
below average feeder (and owner). 
Figure V-23 shows the distributions of returns to the 
owner for Contract A for both the above average feeder and the 
below average feeder. Returns to the owner associated with 
the above average feeder dominate returns to the owner 
associated with the below average feeder. This efficient set 
shows the owner would have a clear preference for contracting 
with the above average feeder given a choice between the two 
feeders. This supports the possibility that the owner may 
want to terminate or modify the contract with the below 
average feeder, given a choice. 
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Table V-1. Sample budget for calculating returns to the 
feeder and the owner in a feeder pig finishing 
enterprise 
Feeder Owner 
Feeder Pig Cost $ 0. 00 36. 23 
Feed Costs $ 0. 00 44. 04 
OTHER VARIABLE COSTS: 
Feeder Compensation (cost to owner) $ 0. 00 8. 20 
Operating Costs $ 0. 00 3. 00 
Labor Cost $ 4. 80 0. 00 
Death Loss $ 0. 00 1. 77 
Marketing Cost $ 0. 00 1. 80 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS: $ 4. 80 95. 04 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS: $ 3. 88 0. 00 
TOTAL PRODUCTION COSTS: $ 8. 68 95. 04 
ESTIMATED CASH FLOW ($/GROUP) $ 1007. 00 2356. 00 
ESTIMATED CASH FLOW ($/HEAD) $ 3. 55 8. 24 
ESTIMATED CASH FLOW ($/CWT.) $ 1. 54 3. 58 
ESTIMATED RETURN OVER ALL COSTS ($/GROUP) $ -103. 29 2356. 00 
ESTIMATED RETURN ($/HEAD) $ -0. 34 8. 24 
ESTIMATED RETURN ($/CWT) $ -0. 15 3. 58 
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Table V-2. Feeder to finish contracts 
Contract A 
Producer: supplies feeding facilities, twice daily 
inspections, carries out vaccination program of 
owner, assists in loading and unloading of animals, 
and must submit death loss forms. 
Owner: provides pigs, feed, vaccination and vet. costs, 
marketing of finished animals, and purchase of feeder 
pigs. 
Compensation: 
$2.50 per head at placement 
$2.00 per head after 60 days 
$1.00 per head at marketing 
$5.50 total base per head 
Death Loss Bonus/Penalty 
4% or higher - owner and grower split death loss 
expense 
3% - $0.30 per head marketed 
3% or lower - $0.30 per head marketed for every 0.5% 
decrease in death loss 
Feed Conversion Bonus 
4.4 # of feed/# of gain - $0.30 per head marketed 
$0.30 per head marketed for every 0.1 improvement in 
feed efficiency 
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Table V-2. (continued) 
Contract B 
Producer; supplies suitable facilities, proper management 
supervision, aids in receiving and shipping of 
hogs, works with veterinarian on vaccination and 
health care program. 
Owner: supplies feeder pigs, feed, vet. costs, and marketing 
of animals 
Compensation: 
$4.00 per head on arrival 
$2.00 per head after 80 days 
$2.50 per head after marketing 
Death Loss Bonus: 
3% - $0.30 per head 
3% or lower - $0.04 per head for every .01% decrease in 
death loss 
Feed Conversion Bonus: 
3.4 # of feed/# of gain - $0.50 per head 
3.4 or lower - $0.25 per head for every O.l 
improvement in feed efficiency 
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Table V-2. (continued) 
Contract C 
Producer: supplies facilities, labor, normal hog management. 
Owner: supplies feeder pigs, feed, vet. expense, and 
marketing. 
Compensation; 
$2.50 inpayment per pig 
$2.50 outpayment per pig 
Death Loss: 
Owner and producer share equally. 
Profit Sharing: 
After all expenses (vet., feed, trucking, pig costs, 
hedging, and marketing) are figured, any profits are 
split equally between owner and producer. 
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Table V-3. Feeder risk and returns per group for the above 
average feeder to finish enterprise 
($75 per head investment) 
Contract 
B® A*° Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Returns^  
Standard Deviation 
Maximum Returns^  
Minimum Returns^  
P(Return > 0) 
$346 $443 $1679 $419 $3724 
$359 $201 $2654 $268 $6469 
$1204 $1219 $10314 $1204 $21730 
($1206) $56 ($1934) ($378) ($18305) 
82% 100% 65% 94% 72% 
F^ixed payment contracts. 
P^rofit sharing contract. 
C^ontract A without death loss penalty. 
"^ All returns in the tables = returns over all costs, 
including depreciation. 
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Table V-4. Feeder cash flow per group for the above average 
feeder to finish enterprise 
($75 per head investment) 
Contract 
A® & A*° Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Cash Flow $1489 $1579 $2817 $1550 $4815 
Standard Deviation $376 $218 $2706 $283 $6618 
Minimum Cash Flow ($80) $1185 ($948) $749 ($15313) 
P(Cash Flow > 0) 99% 100% 79% 100% 76% 
P(Cash Flow < $1236) 21% 3% 37% 10% 30% 
Payback in Years 5.8 5.5 3.1 5.6 1.8 
F^ixed payment contracts. 
bprofit sharing contract. 
C^ontract A without death loss penalty. 
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Table V-5. Owner risk and returns per group for the above 
average feeder to finish enterprise 
Contract 
A® • B® C^  A*c 
Item 
Expected Return $3399 $3316 $2066 $3081 
Standard Deviation $6419 $6450 $4002 $6371 
Maximum Return $21522 $21493 $11441 $20777 
Minimum Return ($17836) (18324) ($16790) ($17104) 
P(Return > 0) 70% 70% 78% 69% 
F^ixed payment contracts. 
bprofit sharing contract. 
C^ontract A without death loss penalty. 
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Table V-6. Feeder risk and returns per group for the below 
average feeder to finish enterprise 
($75 per head investment) 
Contract 
A*° Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Returns ($223) $172 $1143 
Standard Deviation $416 $175 $2519 
Maximum Return $1204 $1219 $9569 
Minimum Return ($1755) $56 ($1996) 
P(Return > 0) 23% 100% 57% 
($29) $2404 
$339 $6476 
$1204 $20228 
($900) ($21011) 
33% 64% 
*Fixed payment contracts. 
P^rofit sharing contract. 
"Contract A without death loss penalty. 
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Table V-7. Feeder cash flow per group for the below average 
feeder to finish enterprise 
($75 per head investment) 
Contract 
A® B® C^  A*° Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Cash Flow $870 $1283 $2289 $1081 $3359 
Standard Deviation $444 $190 $2603 $346 $6895 
Minimum Cash Flow ($658) $1185 ($917) $227 ($17109) 
P(Cash Flow > 0) 97% 100% 69% 100% 68% 
P(Cash Flow < $1236) 83% 71% 46% 76% 38% 
Payback in Years 9.9 6.7 3.8 8.0 2.6 
*Fixed payment contracts. 
bprofit sharing contract. 
C^ontract A without death loss penalty. 
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Table V-8. Owner risk and returns per group for the below 
average feeder to finish enterprise 
Contract 
ga Qb A*( 
Item 
Expected Return $2434 
Standard Deviation $6368 
Maximum Return $19984 
Minimum Return ($19284) 
P(Return > 0) 66% 
$2287 $1295 $2185 
$6460 $4184 $6525 
$19978 $10698 $20183 
($21209) ($19148) ($20067) 
64% 72% 65% 
®Fixed payment contracts. 
P^rofit sharing contract. 
C^ontract A without death loss penalty. 
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Table V-9. Feeder risk and returns per group for the above 
average feeder to finish enterprise 
($105 per head investment) 
Contract 
C^  A*^  Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Return ($149) 
Standard Deviation $359 
Maximum Return $709 
Minimum Return ($1701) 
P(Return > 0) 38% 
P(Cash Flow < $1731) 82% 
Payback in Years 8.1 
($52) $1184 ($76) $3229 
$201 $2654 $268 $6469 
$229 $9819 $709 $21235 
($479) ($2429) ($873) ($18800) 
34% 60% 40% 69% 
78% 43% 72% 32% 
7.7 4.3 7.8 2.5 
F^ixed payment contracts. 
P^rofit sharing contract. 
"Contract A without death loss penalty. 
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Table V-10. Feeder risk and returns per group for the below 
average feeder to finish enterprise 
($105 per head investment) 
Contract 
C^  A*° Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Return ($718) ($323) $648 ($524) $1909 
Standard Deviation $416 $175 $2519 $339 $6476 
Maximum Return $709 $724 $9074 $709 $19733 
Minimum Return ($2250) ($439) ($2491) ($1395) ($21506) 
P(Return > 0) 4% 9% 51% 7% 61% 
P(Cash Flow < $1731) 99% 96% 50% 98% 40% 
Payback in Years 13.9 9.4 5.3 11.2 3.6 
®Fixed payment contracts. 
P^rofit sharing contract, 
C^ontract A without death loss penalty. 
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Table V-11. Sample budget for calculating returns to the 
feeder and the owner in a feeder pig production 
enterprise 
FEEDER OWNER 
INCOME 
Feeder pigs; $131035 336763 
Breeding stock: $ 0 34285 
TOTAL GROSS INCOME $131034 371048 
VARIABLE COSTS 
Payments to feeder; $ 0 131034 
Feed costs; $ 0 124908 
Breeding stock purchases; $ 0 26250 
Operating Costs (miscellaneous) ; $ 22500 0 
Utilities, fuel, elect, and tele.; $ 18750 0 
Vet. and medicine: $ 0 16500 
Labor costs (operator and hired): $ 39000 0 
Marketing costs; $ 0 9953 
TOTAL VARIABLE COSTS $ 80250 308245 
FIXED COSTS 
Depreciation (facilities and equip.); $ 42857 0 
Taxes and Insurance; $ 4500 0 
TOTAL FIXED COSTS $ 47357 0 
TOTAL COST OF PRODUCTION $ 127607 308245 
CASH FLOW $ 46285 62803 
RETURNS OVER ALL COSTS $ 3428 62803 
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Table V-12. Feeder pig production contracts 
Contract A 
Producer: supplies facilities, manpower, vet. costs, 
utilities, manure handling, and bedding 
Contractor: supplies breeding stock, feed, marketing of 
animals, and transport of animals 
Compensation: $14 per feeder pig produced (45 lbs.) 
Contract B 
Producer: supplies totally confined facilities to contractor 
specifications, equipment for manure handling, 
management, utilities, and labor 
Contractor: supplies breeding stock, feed, vet. costs, 
medications, and marketing 
Compensation: $10 per female present in breeding herd each 
month 
$12 per feeder pig produced 
Minimum size: 500 sows or better 
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Table V-13. Annual feeder risk and returns for the above 
average feeder pig production enterprise 
Contract 
B Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Return 
Standard Deviation 
Maximum Return 
Minimum Return 
P(Return > 0) 
$3,133 $41, 
$33,797 $28, 
$77,427 $105, 
($66,249) ($17, 
52% 
132 $69,322 
979 $141,820 
575 $601,602 
601) ($169,602) 
94% 63% 
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Table V-14. Annual Feeder Cash Flow for the Above Average 
Feeder Pig Production Enterprise 
Contract 
B Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Cash Flow $45,990 $84,988 
Standard Deviation $33,797 $28,979 
Minimum Cash Flow ($23,392) $25,255 
P(Cash Flow > 0) 93% 100% 
P(Cash Flow < $42,587) 49% 6% 
Payback in Years 6.5 3.5 
$112,179 
$141,820 
($126,744) 
77% 
38% 
2.7 
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Table V-15. Annual owner risk and returns for the above 
average feeder pig production enterprise 
Contract 
B 
Item 
Expected Return $62,136 $23,137 
Standard Deviation $131,429 $132,751 
Maximum Return $529,033 $500,018 
Minimum Return ($173,357) ($206,534) 
P(Return > 0) 65% 48% 
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Table V-16. Annual feeder risk and returns for the below 
average feeder pig production enterprise 
Contract 
B Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Return ($33,541) $10,754 
Standard Deviation $15,922 $13,671 
Maximum Return $5,444 $44,688 
Minimum Return ($71,503) ($22,912) 
P(Returns >0) 2% 77% 
($2,966) 
$95,000 
$334,368 
($174,722) 
40% 
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Table V-17. Annual feeder cash flow for the below average 
feeder pig production enterprise 
Contract 
B Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Cash Flow $9,315 $53,611 $39,890 
Standard Deviation $15,922 $13,671 $95,006 
Minimum Cash Flow ($28,646) $19,944 $131,915 
P(Cash Flow > 0) 70% 100% 61% 
F(Cash Flow < $42,587) 98% 23% 60% 
Payback in Years 32.2 5.6 7.5 
110 
Table V-18. Annual owner risk and returns for the below 
average feeder pig production enterprise 
Contract 
B 
Item 
Expected Return 
Standard Deviation 
Maximum Return 
Minimum Return 
P(Return > 0) 
$26,542 
$93,197 
$303,618 
($179,069) 
55% 
($17,754) 
$93,621 
$293,086 
($189,048) 
34% 
Expected 
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2.903656 
100 
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©RISK Simulation SGnnpling= Monte Carlo 
EXP.DEATH LOSS #Trials = 5000 
./ 1 t 
Figure V-1. Distribution of feeder pig death loss for the above 
average feeder 
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Figure V-2. Distribution of feed efficiency for the above 
average feeder 
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Figure V-3. Distributions of returns to the above average feeder for all 
contracts and sole proprietorship 
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Figure V-4. Distributions of returns to the above average feeder for all 
contracts 
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Figure V-5. Distributions of returns to the above average feeder for fixed 
payment contracts 
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Figure V-6. Distributions of returns to the owner (above average feeder) 
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Figure V-7. Distribution of feeder pig death loss for the below 
average feeder 
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Figure V-8. Distribution of feed efficiency for the below 
average feeder 
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Figure V-9. Distributions of returns to the below average feeder for all 
contracts and sole proprietorship 
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Figure V-IO. Distributions of returns to the below average feeder for all 
contracts 
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Figure V-12. Distributions of returns to the owner (below average feeder) 
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Figure V-13. Distribution of pigs weaned per litter for the 
above average feeder pig production enterprise 
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Figure V-14. Distribution of litters weaned per sow per year 
for the above average feeder pig production 
enterprise 
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Figure V-15. Distribution of feeder pigs produced for the above 
average feeder pig production enterprise 
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Figure V-16. Distributions of returns to the above average feeder pig 
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Figure V-19. Distribution of pigs weaned per litter for the 
below average feeder pig production enterprise 
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Figure V-20. Distribution of litters weaned per sow per year 
for the below average feeder pig production 
enterprise 
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Figure V-21. Distributions of returns to the below average feeder pig 
enterprise for all contracts and sole proprietorship 
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Figure V-22. Distributions of returns to the owner (below average feeder 
pig production enterprise) 
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Figure V-23. Comparison of the owner's efficient sets for Contract A 
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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Implications of the Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model of contracting presented in Chapter 
III had two major implications. The first was that the 
optimal compensation schedule could be of various forms, 
including fixed payment contracts and profit sharing. The 
optimal compensation schedule depends on factors unique to the 
situation and to the parties involved in the contract. If 
optimality can be associated with stochastic efficiency, then 
the results in Chapter IV support this implication. The 
efficient set of contracts determined through stochastic 
dominance contained both fixed payment and profit sharing 
contracts. The simulation model of Chapter IV also showed how 
factors unique to the feeder, especially feed efficiency, 
death loss of feeder pigs, pigs weaned per litter, and litters 
per sow per year, interacted with the compensation schedule to 
provide different levels of risk and return to both the feeder 
and the owner. The efficient set of alternatives, not just 
the optimal compensation schedule, also depends on factors 
unique to both the owner and feeder. This would seem to 
preclude using data from experiment stations to evaluate 
contracts since feeders' levels of production efficiency vary 
widely and so then will their risk and returns from 
contracting. This would also preclude relying on promotional 
literature to evaluate contracts, since the feeder's operation 
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may or may not be able to obtain similar levels of production 
efficiency. Evaluation of contracts by a feeder should be 
based on their own individual records. 
The second major implication of the theoretical model was 
that the optimal compensation schedule is inversely related to 
the level of effort of the owner. This means that the 
contracts examined are actually models of an agent-agent 
relationship, as opposed to a principal-agent one. The 
implication of this model was that compensation of feeders 
should be related to the quality of inputs provided by the 
owner. For example, feeder pigs from various sources will 
likely have a higher death loss, and base payments and 
performance incentives and penalties should reflect this. 
Alternatively, the feeder should have the right of inspection 
and refusal of any animals coming into his or her facility. 
This would be a forcing contract based on observable factors. 
The weakness of the theoretical model is that it produces 
very complex contracts, dependent on a large number of factors 
which would differ widely from feeder to feeder and from owner 
to owner. Creation of optimal contracts for each situation 
would be very difficult even if all of these factors were 
known due to the time involved and transactions costs. The 
actual contracts that exist are probably second best solutions 
to the problems of transactions costs. Still, there are a 
wide variety of contracts available reflecting different 
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wide variety of contracts available reflecting different 
attitudes and attributes of the parties involved, and this 
does mirror the predictions of the theoretical model that 
optimal contracts may vary widely. 
Implications of the Simulation Model 
The literature review and background to contracting 
indicated that pork production contracts are responses to 
financial stress and are a form of risk management. As a risk 
management tool, contracts are supposed to allow the feeder to 
trade off some expected returns for less risk. In return for 
a less variable return and cash flow, the feeder accepts a 
lower expected return. The owner accepts a large portion of 
risk in return for higher expected returns. The contracts 
examined in the simulation model of Chapter IV generally 
performed this function just as described above, offering 
lower returns and less risk relative to sole proprietorship. 
Owner's returns for these same contracts typically showed 
higher expected returns, more risk, and the potential of large 
losses and large returns. 
As a risk management tool, the results of the contracts 
are similar to the use of futures contracts or forward pricing 
to manage price risk. The contracts place a limit on losses 
to the feeder, but also limit upside potential or maximum 
expected returns. The limits on maximum expected returns are 
a result of biological factors and the producer's management 
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ability. The limit on losses to the feeder results from a 
known payment per feeder pig or finished animal, and so the 
feeder typically deals with production or output risk alone, 
as opposed to price risk. 
The contracts examined also reduced financial risk to the 
feeder. This aspect of contracting would appeal to feeders 
with financial problems or a lack of capital. This would also 
appeal to lenders, since some contracts offered a steady 
income and a better probability of servicing debt. Since the 
lender does not directly share in returns or cash flow above 
debt payments, contracts may increase the amount of capital 
available to agriculture. 
One problem with contracts and financial risk is the 
duration of the contract. The theoretical model of financial 
risk showed that the uncertain life of a contract led to 
underestimation of financial risk and total risk to the 
feeder. The implication is that the duration of the contract 
must be examined carefully by both the feeder and his or her 
lender. The expected payback periods estimated in the 
simulation model showed that termination of a contract after 
one year would leave a feeder with substantial financial 
obligations and that the cash flow from the contracts would 
not recoup the investment in facilities in a single year. 
Another problem with contracts is the change in operating 
leverage for the feeder. Owners provide many of the required 
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inputs and thus in some contracts the owner pays such variable 
costs as feed, veterinary expenses, and medicine. The feeder 
typically supplies facilities and must cover the fixed costs 
associated with these facilities. Fixed costs then become a 
larger portion of the feeder's total costs and the feeder's 
operating leverage increases. This gives the contract feeder 
a high fixed cost commitment, which cannot be reduced even if 
output levels fall. This will make the feeder's returns 
sensitive to small changes in output. The cash flow analysis 
for the contract feeders showed less risk overall relative to 
sole proprietorship, however, indicating that the reduction in 
price risk with contracts more than offsets this increase in 
operating leverage. In addition, the feeder will have smaller 
requirements in terms of working capital since the owner 
provides many of the inputs, and this would also tend to 
offset increases in operating leverage. 
Results for the feeders with low production efficiency do 
show that contracts are not a solution to management problems. 
These feeders did little better than break even and still had 
potential losses with most of the contracts examined. Those 
contracts where the below average feeder fared the best 
offered the lowest returns to the owner. Given a choice, the 
owners would choose to deal with above average feeders. When 
the efficient set of contracts for the owner was compared 
across different feeders, the below average feeder was 
139 
eliminated from this efficient set, implying that production 
efficiency is a key variable for both feeders and owners. The 
interaction of production efficiency with the payment 
schedules of the contracts impacts on the risk and returns for 
both parties. Improving production efficiency should be a 
common goal for both the feeder and the owner as it improves 
the contract's performance for everyone involved. 
One weakness of the simulation study is that contracts 
were examined as a risk management tool, but alternative risk 
management strategies were not compared to these contracts. 
The simulation model overstates risk to the sole proprietor 
and to the owner to the extent that these parties utilize 
futures markets or forward contracting to price their feeder 
pigs or finished animals. Contracting as a risk management 
tool should be compared to other alternative strategies. 
The simulation model also examined risk from the 
perspective of a single enterprise, whereas many farms are 
actually widely diversified businesses, at least in the number 
of enterprises in the farm business. Diversification of 
enterprises has been a standard and successful risk management 
strategy for many farmers over a long period of time. The 
results may overstate the ability of contracts to reduce risk 
as a result. Further study of contracts might examine how 
contracting affects diversification, risk, and returns in a 
whole farm context. 
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The Issue of Equitable Contracts 
One issue considered throughout this study is the 
question of whether or not pork production contracts are 
equitable to both the feeder and to the owner. Based on the 
limited number of contracts examined previously the answer to 
this question seems to be that some contracts are equitable 
and some are not. 
The theoretical model indicates that contracts may not be 
equitable to the feeder if the owner's quantity and quality of 
inputs do not enter into the optimal compensation schedule. 
This means that an equitable contract must allow for some 
monitoring of the performance of each of the parties, rather 
than basing compensation only on actual output. The contracts 
examined allowed monitoring of the feeder in terms of 
facilities and production efficiency, but did not allow for 
monitoring of the owner's performance by the feeder. The 
theoretical model also indicated an increase in risk for the 
feeder due to the short term duration of the contracts 
relative to the time required to pay for facilities. This was 
examined through the assumption of a stochastic life for the 
contract. The implication was that the length of the contract 
should, in some way, be tied to the financing terms of the 
facility. However, increasing the length of the contract and 
limiting the ability of either parties to cancel the contract 
could pose different equity issues for both the feeder and 
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owner. For example, an owner probably not want to continue a 
contract for an extended period of time with a feeder that is 
a consistently poor manager. If the feeder is truly an 
independent contractor the owner should not necessarily be 
obliged to provide management expertise (although the owner 
may very well choose to do so). In a similar fashion, a 
feeder would not necessarily want to work with an owner who 
provides poor quality inputs or management support over an 
extended contract. 
The risk and returns for the contracts examined through 
the simulation model also aid in examining the issue of 
equitable contracts. Pork production contracts are a business 
organization that allows risk sharing between the owner and 
the feeder. The sharing of risk is a fundamental way of 
reducing the risk to each party. Thus, contracts may be seen 
as a way of modifying the shape of the probability 
distributions of returns faced by each sharing partner. In 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management through 
these risk sharing arrangements, the probability distributions 
of returns for each party should be compared to a benchmark 
distribution. That benchmark should be the probability 
distribution of returns for the sole proprietor, assuming both 
owners and feeders have this alternative available to them. 
This allows a comparison of the risks and returns faced by the 
owner and feeder in a contractual arrangement relative to an 
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alternative available to both of them, sole proprietorship. 
Equitable contracts should thus benefit both parties as a risk 
sharing arrangement as compared to either party operating 
solely on their own. 
In order to make this comparison results for the above 
average feeder and the associated owner (for a feeder to 
finish operation with an investment of $105 per head) were 
utilized. The efficient set of contracts for the above 
average feeder consisted of contract B, contract C, and sole 
proprietorship. The distributions of returns to the owner for 
each of these contracts can then be combined into a set of 
possible alternatives. This provides the necessary 
information to compare the probability distributions of 
returns for the contract feeder and owner with the benchmark 
distribution of the sole proprietor. Table VI-1 shows the 
risk and returns for each of these alternatives. Figure VI-1 
shows a comparison of the cumulative distributions of returns 
for the feeder and owner under Contract C (profit sharing) 
with that of sole proprietorship. Figure VI-2 shows a 
comparison of returns for the feeder and owner under contract 
B (fixed payment) with that of sole proprietorship. 
These comparisons provide some expected and unexpected 
results. An examination of Figure VI-1 and Table VI-1 
indicates that the profit sharing contract C provides the 
results expected from a risk sharing arrangement. Relative to 
143 
sole proprietorship, both the owner and feeder are able to 
reduce risk through a contractual arrangement with each other. 
This can be seen by examining the distributions and by the 
fact that the standard deviation and the expected minimum 
return under the contract is less than that of sole 
proprietorship. The penalty to these sharing parties is that 
the expected return is reduced. The contract is accomplishing 
the expected result of a risk sharing arrangement for both the 
owner and feeder. In addition the profit sharing contract 
provides the feeder a reasonably good chance of paying off the 
contract in less than seven years. This would then seem to be 
an equitable contract for both parties given that they are 
engaged in risk sharing. 
The fixed payment contract, contract B, provides the 
expected result for a risk sharing arrangement for the feeder. 
Table VI-1 and Figure VI-2 indicate that the feeder does 
achieve the expected result of reduced risk (and reduced 
returns) with this risk sharing arrangement. Standard 
deviation and expected minimum returns for the feeder are less 
than that of sole proprietorship. The one problem the feeder 
may have with the contract is the lack of ability to pay for 
facilities. This is reflected by the expected return of 
negative $323. The owner is apparently receiving the 
advantage of being able to utilize the feeder's facilities 
without paying for their use and replacement. The equity of 
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this particular contract is thus questionable. 
The results for the owner under this fixed payment 
contract are somewhat unexpected for a risk sharing 
arrangement. Expected returns for the owner are very similar 
to expected returns for sole proprietorship, as is the 
standard deviation of returns. In fact, the cumulative 
distributions for the owner and the sole proprietor are 
virtually identical. The risk sharing arrangement has not 
reduced risk or returns for the owner in contrast to the above 
results. There would seem to be at least two possible 
explanations for this result. One explanation is that the 
costs to the owner have been understated by the model. For 
example, no debt service requirements for the owner have been 
incorporated into the analysis. In addition, the model does 
not incorporate any labor or management costs for the owner 
such as those associated with a field manager who works 
directly with the feeder. This would explain the similarity 
of expected returns for the owner and the sole proprietor. 
Adding these costs to the owner's cost data would reduce 
expected returns. These additional costs would not, however, 
explain the similarity of risk under these alternatives and so 
would not be a full explanation of these unexpected results. 
Another explanation of these results would incorporate the 
additional costs to the owner discussed above and the reduced 
risk from not having to invest in facilities. Recall that the 
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feeder must provide and pay for facilities. The owner thus 
has no fixed investment costs with this contract. This 
implies that the cost of exiting the contract is minimal. If 
the owner does not have to invest in facilities, this would 
provide a great deal of flexibility and reduce the risk 
exposure of the owner. The owner has no operating leverage to 
contend with and can walk away from the facilities by 
terminating the contract. The terms of the contract allow the 
owner to do so. The magnitude of reduced risk for the owner 
due to this flexibility and lack of fixed investment has not 
been included in the model. Subtracting additional costs of 
labor and management to the owner's returns along with this 
flexibility would then provide reduced risk and returns for 
the owner as expected with a risk sharing arrangement. Even 
so, the contract is not necessarily equitable at the 
investment level of $105 per head since the owner is still 
able to utilize the feeder's facilities without compensating 
the feeder fully. 
It should be noted, however, that at an investment level 
of $75 per head this same fixed payment contract offered the 
feeder positive returns and a 100 percent chance of meeting 
debt servicing requirements. The fixed payment contract is 
very sensitive to fairly small changes in costs and cash 
flows. 
The above analysis points out an important facet of 
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contract pork production from the owner's point of view. The 
owner essentially substitutes a compensation schedule 
(payments to the feeder) for investment in facilities. The 
cost sharing that occurs in this type of arrangement thus 
provides the owner with more flexibility than a sole 
proprietorship. Further research into contracts should 
incorporate this substitution and flexibility into the 
analysis in examining the equity of contracts. 
Implications for Further Research 
The number of contracts examined in this study was limited. 
Yet even among this small number of contracts there were a 
number of significant differences that impacted on the risk 
and returns to the feeder and the owner. A comparison of 
additional contracts could be easily be done and other 
significant differences among contracts might be identified. 
It might also be beneficial to examine additional contracts by 
region and by the amount of competition among owners in a 
geographical area to examine the impact of these factors upon 
contractual arrangements. 
Contracts are offered by different economic agents with 
differing goals and objectives. Contracts could be examined 
for systematic differences due to the agent that is providing 
the arrangement. For example, how do contracts offered by 
cooperatives to members compare to contracts offered by 
independent contractors or feed companies or food processors? 
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Another group of agents that offer contracts to farmers are 
other farmers. How do these contracts compare to contracts 
offered by outside investors. 
Another topic for further study is how will contracting 
impact on producers who choose to remain independent. Meat 
packers are typically interested in a large and steady volume 
of animals into their facilities. If contracts were able to 
provide this volume, how would this impact on the marketing 
opportunities of independent producers. 
An issue typically ignored by economists is the 
organizational behavior aspects of contracting. If an owner 
is represented by a field manager who works directly with 
feeders, the relationship between the field manager and the 
feeder could have an impact on the success or failure of the 
contract. Presumably, a field manager would have some 
background in pork production. It might be possible for 
management practices of feeders to be improved through an 
owner or field manager with a broad knowledge of facilities 
and production practices. The contracts evaluated in this 
study showed that some contracts were mutually beneficial to 
both parties if the feeder was an efficient producer, so there 
is some incentive for owners to provide management expertise. 
Little is known about how feeders respond to specific 
production incentives. Theoretical models in the agency 
literature implied that standards should be set at high levels 
148 
to encourage high levels of performance, or that standards 
should be enforced by severe penalties. Feeders might or 
might not respond to incentives in the manner which the 
theoretical models predict. One possible advantage of 
contracts and their production objectives would be to make the 
feeder very goal oriented and to implement management by 
objectives into the production process. Feeders would still 
be motivated by profit, but in this case profit would depend 
on setting and achieving production objectives. This would 
not involve the same marketing objectives of an independent 
producer. Feeders might respond favorably to the smaller 
number of objectives inherent in contracts or they might 
reject standards and production practices imposed upon them by 
owners. 
The returns estimated by the simulation model were on a 
before tax basis. Farmers currently can use cash accounting 
to calculate taxable income and cash accounting allows for the 
prepayment of expenses and delay of sales receipts to lessen 
tax liability. In a contractual arrangement, the expenses of 
the farmer may not include feed as it is provided by the 
owner. This might limit the ability of the farmer to prepay 
expenses and so increase his or her tax liability. 
Finally, contracts and their impact on pork production 
and the structure of the pork industry should be examined on 
an ongoing basis, not just in one study every decade or so. 
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This would allow the development of a data base which would 
aid in the understanding of contracts and how these contracts 
might be made more effective. If contracting in pork 
production continues to increase throughout the United States, 
this would represent still another major structural change in 
American agriculture. A data base on contracting would then 
aid in the understanding of how agriculture and the rural 
areas of the United States are changing and evolving over 
time. 
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Table VI-1. Contract C: owner and feeder returns for the 
above average feeder to finish enterprise 
($105 per head investment) 
Feeder Owner Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Return $1184 $2066 $3229 
Standard Deviation $2654 $4002 $6469 
Maximum Return $9819 $11441 $21235 
Minimum Return ($2429) ($16790) ($18800) 
151 
Table VI-2. Contract B: owner and feeder returns for the 
above average feeder to finish enterprise 
($105 per head investment) 
Feeder Owner Sole 
Proprietor 
Item 
Expected Return ($52) $3316 $3229 
Standard Deviation $203 $6450 $6469 
Maximum Return $229 $21493 $21235 
Minimum Return ($479) ($18324) ($18800) 
1.00 
o.so,, 
CP 
UR 
MD 
UB OiO 
LA 
AB 
11 o.so 
IL 
UI 
ET 
Y 
0.00 
-0.190 
0.20 
E+02 -O.llOE+02 -0.040E#02 0.030E*02 0.100E*02 0.210E*02 
LEGEND: Fu&r 
DHntr 
Sole Prop. 
Figure VI-1. Contract c: owner and feeder returns for the above average 
feeder to finish enterprise ($105 per head investment) 
1.00 + 
0.80 ,, CP 
UR 
HO 
UB O.GO 
LA 
AB 
ÎI 0.40 
IL 
UI 
EI 
Y 
0. 
0.20 
..V .....V—"V" J-.U-' 
V»" 
• vS*-
-0.180E#02 
+ 
/ yi""'" 
.'I 
y 
.•'X 
-0.il0E«02 -0.01ÛE02 
+ 
0.030E«02 0.100E*02 
k 
0.210E+02 
LE(iEtiCi: FKdtr 
OHntr 
So It Prop. 
Figure VI-2. Contract B: owner and feeder returns for the above average 
feeder to finish enterprise ($105 per head investment) 
154 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anderson, Jock, John L. Dillon, and J. Brian Hardaker. 
Agricultural Decision Analysis. Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1977. 
Anderson, Kim B., and John E. Ikerd. "Whole Farm Risk-Rating 
Microcomputer Model," Southern Journal of Agricultural 
Economics (July 1985); 183-87. 
Blaich, 0. P. "Integration in Theory with an Application to 
Hogs," Journal of Farm Economics (December 1960): 1280-
1296. 
Blatt, John M. Dynamic Economic Systems. New York: M. E. 
Sharpe Inc., 1983. 
Callen, Jeffrey L. and Joshua Livnat. "Responsibility 
Accounting and Asymmetry of Information," Managerial and 
Decision Economics 10 (1989): 81-84. 
Carmichael, H. Lome. "The Agents-Agents Problem: Payment by 
Relative Output," Journal of Labor Economics 1 (January 
1983): 50-65. 
Cochran, Mark J. and Rob Raskin. "A User's Guide to 
Generalized Stochastic Dominance Program for IBM PC 
Version GSD 2.1," University of Arkansas Staff Paper 
SP0688 (April 1988). 
Demski, Joel S., and Gerald A. Feltham. "Economic Incentives 
in Budgetary Control Systems," The Accounting Review 2 
(1978): 336-59. 
Futrell, Gene. "Contract Production of Hogs in Iowa," 
unpublished manuscript. Department of Economics, Iowa 
State University, 1989. 
Futrell, Gene, and Robert N. Wisner. Marketing for Farmers. 
St. Louis: Doane Information Services, 1987. 
Gabriel, S. C. and C. B. Baker. "Concepts of Business and 
Financial Risk," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 62 (1980): 727-33. 
Hertz, David B., and Howard Thomas. Risk Analysis and its 
Applications. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983. 
155 
Hetland, Kristi, and James Kliebenstein. "Producing Feeder 
Pigs on Contract: A Comparison," Iowa State University 
Staff Paper No. 230, (August 1991). 
Holmstrom, Bengt. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell 
Journal of Economics 10 (1979): 74-91. 
Iowa Department of Agriculture. "Grain Market News," Des 
Moines, Iowa [1985]. 
Jolly, Robert W. "Risk Management in Agricultural 
Production," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
65 (1983): 1107-1113. 
Kliebenstein, James, Emmet Stevermer, and Chris Hillburn. 
"Evaluation of Contract Provisions and Performance," 
paper presented at seminar "Producing Hogs Under 
Contract: What's In It For You?," Department of 
Economics, Iowa State University, May, 1989. 
Lawrence, John D, Marvin Hayenga, James Kliebenstein, and V. 
James Rhodes. "Producing and Marketing Hogs Under 
Contract," in Pork Industrv Handbook. Iowa State 
University Cooperative Extension Service, Ames. PIH-6, 
December 1992. 
Long, James. "Legal Analysis of Hog Production Contracts," 
unpublished manuscript, Iowa Pork Producers Association, 
June 1988. 
McDonald, Glenn M. "New Directions in the Economic Theory of 
Agency," Canadian Journal of Economics 17 (August 1984): 
415-40. 
Mirrlees, James. "Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and 
Uncertainty," in Essavs on Economic Behavior Under 
Uncertainty, ed. M. Balch, D. McFadden, and S. Wu, 
243-58. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 
1974. 
Reimund, Donn, T. Martin, and J. Moore. "Structural Change in 
Agriculture: The Experience for Broilers, Fed Cattle, 
and Processing Vegetables," Washington D.C., USDA T.B. 
1648, Economics and Statistics Service, April 1981. 
Rhodes, V. James. "U.S. Contract Production of Hogs," 
University of Missouri-Columbia, Agricultural Economics 
Report No. 1990-1. 
156 
Rhodes, V. James, David Flottman, and Michael H. Proctor. 
"Basic Data on U.S. Mid/Large Size Hog Operations," 
unpublished manuscripts. University of Missouri-
Columbia, 1987 and 1989. 
Roy, Ewell Roy. Contract Farming and Economic Integration. 
Danville: The Interstate Printers & Publishers, Inc., 
1972. 
Stevermer, Emmet J. "Swine Enterprise Record Summary," 
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University, 
Ames, various issues 1985-1989. 
Tomer, John F. Organizational Capital. New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1987. 
United States Department of Agriculture, Livestock. Meat. and 
Wool Market News Weekly Summary and Statistics. 
Washington D.C., Statistical Reporting Service, 
1985-1989. 
Wilson, Paul N., and Carl E. Gundersen. "Financial Risk in 
Cotton Production," Southern Journal of Agricultural 
Agricultural Economics. (December 1985): 199-206. 
Zering, Kelly and Allen Seals. "Financial Characteristics of 
Swine Production Contracts," American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 65 (1989): 1351. 
